The Quest for Relevant Air Power

282 │ Swedish Air Force
Threat and Risk Perception. During the Cold War, Soviet-
Swedish relations reached periods of considerable tension. As described
later, Soviet fighters shot down at least one Swedish aircraft
over the Baltic Sea in 1952, and in the early 1980s, Soviet
submarines intruded into Swedish waters.
In 1990 Swedish authorities urged caution in the Swedish response
to the events unfolding in Eastern Europe. They were indeed
very suspicious of the permanence of the developments in
the Soviet Union. A setback in Soviet reforms by communist hardliners
was still regarded as a possibility. 19 Only after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in late 1991 did the process of gradually transforming
the Swedish defence posture start. While the immediate
threat of a major armed invasion across coastal or land borders
was ruled out from then onwards, such a scenario was required to
be met after one year of preparation. Yet, it was deemed necessary
that the armed forces be capable of dealing with limited strategic
surprise attacks against key targets in Sweden at any time. 20
In 1996–97 the Swedish government concluded that the security
situation had further evolved in a positive way. This development
was mainly attributed to the stabilising function of an enlarging
European Union. 21 However, it was only in 1999 that the
threat of an invasion ceased to be the dominant factor in shaping
Sweden’s defence architecture. Henceforth, a full-scale invasion of
Swedish territory did not seem feasible within the time span of 10
years, provided that Sweden had a basic defence capability at its
disposal. These fundamental improvements in the security assessment
initiated a development towards smaller but qualitatively
advanced armed forces, with the aim of effectively using them
both nationally and internationally. However, limited surprise attacks,
primarily from the air, were still deemed a potential threat
that could occur any time with the aim of coercing Swedish decision
makers. 22
Government Bill 1999/2000:30, The New Defence, thus represented
a milestone step in Swedish defence policy. 23 According to
the former director of the Defence Commission, Michael Mohr,
reduced financial resources played a significant role in this reorientation
in 1999. A balance had to be struck between tasks and
resources. As a result, Swedish decision makers were forced to accept
the realities of a changed security environment. 24