The Quest for Relevant Air Power

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managing regional crisis quickly with lightly equipped, joint contingents.
Airlift and firepower delivered by air have proven critical
in these operations. The ability to rapidly deploy air assets over
long distances and to operate them from bare bases was also critical
in the deployment of French aircraft to Central Asia in early
2002, making the FAF the first European air force to engage targets
in Afghanistan with fighter-bombers. The French contingent
paved the way for a European F-16 component. Despite these
achievements, Chirac’s goal—to deploy up to 100 combat aircraft
or the FAF’s theoretical contribution of up to 80 combat aircraft
with additional support aircraft to potential deployed EU operations—proved
too ambitious given the shortfalls in strategic airlift
or AAR. So far, the FAF has never deployed simultaneously more
than 50 combat aircraft to a particular post–Cold War campaign,
with Operation Allied Force witnessing the largest deployment.
While the deployment to Manas in early 2002 can be considered
an achievement in terms of rapid power projection, it nevertheless
has to be pointed out that the detachment, including six Mirage
2000Ds, was far below the quantitative goals above.
Notwithstanding the FAF’s increasing involvement in combined
operations, only in 2008 did it issue an air power doctrine.
Released the same year as Sarkozy’s Defence White Paper, the hallmarks
of the latter are clearly visible. Amongst others, it implicitly
introduces the concept of parallel warfare, which supposedly produces
strategic paralysis.
Prior to the 2008 air power doctrine, French air power thinking
rather found expression in a bottom-up approach. This is particularly
demonstrated by FAF officers expressing their views in Penser
les ailes françaises and elsewhere. Moreover, through the establishment
of two air power conference series in 2004–5, the FAF invited
scholars, industrialists, and others to share their views on French
air power, representing a significant step towards critical thinking.
Given that French military thinking was long overshadowed
by nuclear doctrine, modern thinking on conventional air power
is relatively young. While the reemerging French air power debate
focused on historical issues and the idea of an independent
mission—as exemplified by the keen interest in Douhet’s and
Warden’s theories—the focus has turned to current challenges in
joint warfare.