The Quest for Relevant Air Power

158 │ GERMAN Air Force
evacuation operations, the stabilisation forces for joint operations
of low and medium intensity during an extended period of time,
and the support forces for comprehensive joint support. Response
forces were especially set up to comply with international requirements
such as German contributions to the NATO Response Force
or the EU battle groups. 38 Despite this new emphasis upon power
projection, universal conscription in an adapted form was retained,
as it was considered an indispensable requirement for operational
readiness, effectiveness, economic efficiency, and reconstitution for
the purpose of national defence against conventional attack. 39
The White Paper 2006 with its more conservative focus reemphasised
the value of universal conscription, offering a strong bond between
society and the military. Accordingly, it announced that the
number of conscripts would be increased by approximately 13,000
during 2006 and 2007, particularly to guarantee conscription equity.
It can be concluded that this increase did not aim at strengthening the
German armed forces’ power projection capacities. In 2006 only 20
per cent of deployed personnel were extended-service conscripts. 40
The renewed emphasis upon conscription was in line with the renewed
value of “national and collective defence in the classical
sense.” 41 Yet as of mid-2010, suspending conscription has been seriously
discussed, and on 22 November 2010, Defence Minister
Guttenberg formally announced the government’s plan to suspend
conscription effective 1 July 2011. 42
Expeditionary warfare requires not only deployable troops but
also military planning and command facilities. During the Cold
War, the German armed forces had no autonomous planning capacities
at the operational level and were designed solely to perform
their missions within NATO’s integrated military structure. 43
The lack of a national planning and command structure significantly
inhibited German participation in out-of-area operations
during the first half of the 1990s. 44 Consequently, the 1992 Defence
Policy Guidelines and the 1994 Defence White Book called for an
autonomous planning capacity. 45 Only cautiously, however, were
limited national command and control structures established. In
January 1995, a joint command centre was set up, the tasks of
which were limited to relatively minor UN missions. As a premium
was put upon the primacy of politics, the new joint command
centre was primarily designed as an aid for the defence