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The Quest for Relevant Air Power

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Chapter 7<br />

Conclusion<br />

As the preliminary findings demonstrate, each air <strong>for</strong>ce has responded<br />

to the air power challenges of the post–Cold War era according<br />

to its context. <strong>The</strong> following discussion synthesises the responses of<br />

the air <strong>for</strong>ces examined across the four guiding challenges—shifting<br />

defence and alliance policies, real operations, new intellectualism in air<br />

power thinking and doctrine, and procurement.<br />

Shifting Defence and Alliance Policies<br />

Since the threat and risk spectrum of the post–Cold War era was<br />

no longer determined by two opposing blocs, the military-strategic<br />

focus shifted from territorial defence to deployed operations. <strong>Power</strong><br />

projection in support of the UN, the ESDP, or NATO has become<br />

the determining factor in shaping Continental European air power.<br />

Amongst the four countries, the Netherlands was the first to accept<br />

these new realities; consequently, its military trans<strong>for</strong>mation was<br />

the most advanced in the period studied. Its rapid shift towards expeditionary<br />

warfare allowed the RNLAF to contribute to deployed<br />

operations disproportionately to the size of the country. France, under<br />

the presidency of Jacques Chirac, came to terms with the new<br />

realities in the mid-1990s. Whereas the country’s military strategic<br />

doctrine had long been dominated by the nuclear <strong>for</strong>ce, conventional<br />

power assumed centre stage, offering the possibility to prevent,<br />

contain, or stabilise regional crises.<br />

Germany and Sweden, on the other hand, only began to accept<br />

the new strategic realities at the end of the 1990s, significantly<br />

delaying the trans<strong>for</strong>mation of their air <strong>for</strong>ces. Germany’s<br />

historical legacy and the vestiges of Sweden’s neutral tradition<br />

exacerbated these delays. Moreover, both nations had been<br />

frontline states, and their decision makers found it difficult to<br />

relax after the Cold War. <strong>The</strong> GAF had a unique experience in<br />

the early 1990s, when it was tasked to disband the East German<br />

<strong>Air</strong> Force and to integrate some of its personnel and equipment.<br />

This process did not lead to a hybrid between Western and East-

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