The Quest for Relevant Air Power

POST–COLD WAR CHALLENGES │ 43
The next edition of AFDD 1 in November 2003 was designed to
provide guidance for the application of air power in the war on terror.
According to Gen John P. Jumper, key themes included contingency
operations, network-centric warfare, and American air power’s
contribution to the joint battle. 183 Regarding the latter, AFDD 1
argues that effectively integrating the four service branches’ capabilities
remained pivotal to successful joint war fighting. 184 This
stands in stark contrast to the 1992 AFM 1-1, which emphasises the
effectiveness of air power in relatively independent aerospace campaigns.
Operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003—
as opposed to Desert Storm with a distinct air and ground campaign—certainly
caused this shift in doctrine.
Devoid of any national strategic air power doctrine, the RAF
began to realise towards the end of the Cold War the importance
of establishing a coherent and systematic doctrine to think about
air power in overall and integrated campaign terms. This differed
from the stand-alone roles characterising the RAF’s presentation
of air power since the 1957 defence review and the handover of
principal responsibilities for the nuclear deterrent to the Navy. 185
Against the backdrop of inherent scepticism within the RAF towards
doctrine and concern amongst senior RAF officers that a
national doctrine might conflict with NATO manuals, an attempt
at producing a new RAF doctrine manual was undertaken in 1988.
With the approval of the assistant chief of the Air Staff, the first
edition of the RAF air power doctrine, Air Publication (AP) 3000,
was produced with a limited print run. 186
The doctrine was finally published in 1991. In his foreword, Air
Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding, chief of the Air Staff, identifies
two fundamental reasons for establishing a national air power
doctrine. First, quantum leaps in air power technology had made
a conceptual grasp of the new capabilities and limitations for informed
doctrinal discussion indispensable. Secondly, according
to Harding, the new doctrine was supposed to amalgamate past
experience with forethought to prepare airmen to meet the challenges
of the day. 187 A reference to the turmoil in the international
arena was not yet made, showing that the doctrine was still embedded
into a Cold War type of setting. Typical Cold War features
of AP 3000 were its emphasis upon offensive counterair missions
using the JP233 airfield attack system, particularly designed for