The Quest for Relevant Air Power

swedish Air Force │ 291
number of operational Gripen squadrons was reduced from seven
in 2004 to three in 2005 and increased to four again in 2006, with
more JAS 39C/Ds delivered. 65 These squadrons are to be fully
equipped with the JAS 39C/D version. 66 Moreover, while the air
defence capability had lost in relative importance, the CAS capability
gained unprecedented emphasis, as it was regarded as a critical
capability for robust peace support operations. 67 This shift in
priorities went hand in hand with Sweden’s efforts in setting up a
Nordic EU battle group.
Yet against the backdrop of a reasserting Russia, the 2009 government
bill, A Functional Defence, declared that “the air force
must primarily develop the capability to operate in our region. It
should also be able to participate in air operations together with
other countries, in Sweden and within and outside our region.” 68
With the SwAF and the Swedish Navy readopting a more national
focus, the Swedish Army was expected to carry the main bulk of
international missions. 69 As regards the SwAF, these developments
represented a shift away from the rather one-sided thrust towards
deployed operations. Yet, interoperability remained the cornerstone
of the SwAF’s transformation. Moreover, this did not preclude
potential deployed operations. The Navy, with its similar
regional focus, was increasingly involved in the EU’s anti-piracy
mission off Somalia, Operation Atalanta, and in April 2010, a
Swedish rear admiral became the force commander of the European
Union Naval Force. This maritime effort was supported by
helicopters from Sweden’s Armed Forces Helicopter Wing. 70
While table 5 (next page) clearly reveals the prioritisation of
air defence in the 1990s, it also shows the massive force reductions
and thrust towards a homogenous combat aircraft fleet after
1999. These reductions can be attributed to a perceived improvement
in security in Sweden’s close neighbourhood and the demands
of potential international operations and interoperability.
Deployable combat aircraft units require larger investments than
units tasked solely for territorial defence. For instance, the JAS
39C/D rapid reaction units demand intense training, particularly
in the areas of planning and executing multinational operations
and close air support. 71 Prior to the SwAF’s significant force
reductions, such intense focus upon training was not conceivable.
In the later stages of the Cold War, the average flying hours