The Quest for Relevant Air Power

352 │ CONCLUSION
RNLAF leadership envisions that a sound grasp of doctrine and
air power theory will empower Dutch airmen to be on a par with
the Netherlands’ most advanced allies and maximize their operational
effectiveness.
As revealed by Germany’s response to Desert Storm, the GAF
was uneasy with offensive air operations in the wake of the Cold
War. This stance also reflected on air power doctrine. US operational
dominance naturally led to US doctrinal dominance, which
put a premium upon offensive air operations. Germany’s difficulty
in reconciling offensive air power doctrine with its historical
legacy resulted in doctrinal stagnation throughout the 1990s.
Right after Desert Storm in March 1991, the GAF published its
first air power doctrine. The document was doctrinally anchored
in the later stages of the Cold War. Unlike the RAF, however, which
also published its first edition of AP 3000 in 1991 and saw a need
to revise the doctrine to codify the lessons of Desert Storm, the
GAF was reluctant to incorporate those lessons. Whereas in the
later stages of the Cold War, GAF officers regularly expressed their
views on issues such as the GAF’s role within NATO’s defence
doctrine in various journals, in the 1990s fewer GAF officers wrote
about doctrinal issues. Only in the environment of the 2002–3 defence
reform did the GAF again approach doctrinal and conceptual
issues more proactively. The establishment of the Air Power
Centre and the GAF’s lead role in the formation of NATO’s Joint
Air Power Competence Centre are part of this reorientation, perceived
as necessary in light of recent German commitments to
cooperative endeavours such as the NATO Response Force or the
EU Air Rapid Response Concept.
Doctrine has not only been a response to the challenges of deployed
operations but has also been a carrier of institutional interests.
The SwAF and FAF responded to joint doctrine manuals by
developing single-service doctrines. The GAF started to revise its
air power doctrine when faced with a new armed forces reform
that put a premium upon the joint level. Its leadership perceived it
necessary to express explicitly air power’s capabilities so as not to
lose out relative to the other services.
The senior command echelon plays a crucial role in the doctrine
development process, as particularly exemplified by the
Royal Australian Air Force. Recognising the importance of doc-