The Quest for Relevant Air Power

154 │ GERMAN Air Force
dependence in the international system meant that any form of
destabilization—military or non-military—was considered to have
the potential of producing ripple effects that affected the West. 13
In 1994 the Defence White Book largely reiterated the views of
the preceding Defence Policy Guidelines, and Russia’s military
potential still remained a significant factor in German threat
perception. Warning time in case of a massive Russian military
buildup, however, was no longer specified. 14 Only in 2000 did
the Weizsäcker Commission report unambiguously state that,
regarding a major military threat against NATO, a warning time
of at least eight to 10 years would give the West sufficient time
for military reconstitution. 15
Against the backdrop of 11 September, the 2003 Defence Policy
Guidelines particularly identified religiously motivated extremism
and fanaticism in combination with international terrorism as
threats to modern civilization. Concerning conventional military
threats, the Defence Policy Guidelines takes the view that, though
they could be ruled out for the foreseeable future, they could not
in the long term. 16 While three years later the White Paper 2006
identifies international terrorism as “the most immediate danger,”
it also refers to a “soft” security spectrum including challenges
such as fragile statehood in developing countries, migration, or
pandemics. The document further highlights issues that are intrinsically
related to Germany’s economic prosperity, such as energy
and resource security or secure transportation routes and
communication. Moreover, the white paper singles out illegal
arms trade, regional conflicts, weapons proliferation, and military
buildup in many parts of the world as destabilising factors. It concludes
that “these new types of risks cannot . . . be countered by
solely or predominantly using military means.” 17
Tasks of the Armed Forces. During the Cold War era, the West
German armed forces were almost exclusively geared up for deterrence
and defence against a potential full-scale aggression from
the East. In 1992 the Defence Policy Guidelines added international
crises and conflict management as the second main function. 18
These two main functions were broken down into five tasks:
• protecting Germany and its citizens against political blackmail
and external danger,