The Quest for Relevant Air Power

244 │ ROYAL NETHERLANDS Air Force
dom, but indirectly by deploying guided missile units to Turkey in
early 2003. In February the Dutch government received an official
Turkish request for three Patriot units and additional Stinger
teams to be stationed in eastern Turkey. 113 Operation Display Deterrence
was primarily designed to protect NATO air bases. In less
than a month from the receipt of the Turkish request, these Patriot
units were operational in Turkey. 114
Courtesy Netherlands Institute for Military History
A Dutch Patriot unit at the Turkish air base Diyarbakir in 2003 during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. This was the second deployment to the Middle
East since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 1991 during Operation Desert
Storm, RNLAF Patriots were dispatched to Turkey and Israel.
Against the backdrop of the Netherlands’ defence spending—
below the NATO average—real operations throughout the post–Cold
War era have offered a new opportunity to show alliance solidarity.
Air power has been perceived by Dutch politicians as allowing
participation in high-intensity conflicts without the prospect of
suffering heavy casualties. Furthermore, the RNLAF’s excellent
performance in conflicts at the upper end of the spectrum of military
force restored the image of the Netherlands armed forces in
the wake of Srebrenica. 115 Yet this excellent performance—particularly
during the course of Allied Force—was deliberately played
down internally to avoid too militaristic of an impression, potentially
irritating the Dutch constituency. 116 The issue of having rela-