The Quest for Relevant Air Power

GERMAN Air Force │ 177
Germany’s lukewarm response to the request. Later on, Germany
reinforced its deployment by sending 11 air defence batteries. 165
Germany’s and the GAF’s reactions to Desert Storm can be
characterised by discomfort, both politically and militarily. Uneasiness
with offensive air power doctrine in deployed operations
led to a heated political debate regarding the proper interpretation
of the German constitution, as is examined in the following pages.
Militarily, uneasiness with offensive air power doctrine—as demonstrated
during Desert Storm—led to a gap in doctrinal thought
throughout the 1990s. The GAF published its first air power doctrine
on 22 March 1991, immediately after Desert Storm. Yet it
was still firmly embedded in a Cold War setting, and no reference
was made to the revolutionary developments of Desert Storm.
Unlike in the case of the RAF, no successful attempt at revising the
doctrine was made to reflect the lessons of Desert Storm. This
doctrinal gap was mirrored in a lack of a broader doctrinal debate
in the form of publications, as is analysed further below. In terms
of equipment, particularly in the area of precision-guided air-toground
munitions, the GAF started to implement the lessons of
Desert Storm only belatedly. At the time of Allied Force in 1999,
there were still no LGB-capable German Tornados available. This
can be related to two further issues: a strained budget situation in
the wake of German reunification and the main defensive mission
of the German armed forces. As regards the former, the 1994 Defence
White Book announced that any major equipment programmes
for the main defence forces would be deferred to the
period after 2000. As regards the latter, Russia’s military potential
remained a significant factor in Germany’s threat perception
throughout the 1990s. Accordingly, territorial defence continued
to be the constitutional bedrock for the German armed forces and
determined their size and structure. This, in turn, led to a continuation
of Cold War concepts. For instance, unlike the RAF, which
disposed of its submunitions dispenser system partly as a consequence
of Desert Storm, the GAF retained its equivalent system as
the main armament of its Tornado fleet throughout the 1990s, as
is analysed further below.
From October 1992, German AWACS personnel contributed to
the airspace surveillance of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. 166 Whilst
this represented the only German contribution to Operation Deny