The Quest for Relevant Air Power

356 │ CONCLUSION
strengthen the interrelationship within both the NATO and EU
alliances. It has enabled Germany to be less concerned about
economy of scale—particularly in the area of combat aircraft—
with the burden being shared by several partners. It can hence be
argued that the advantages of cooperation outweigh the handicaps.
Yet, the GAF’s evolvement into a more balanced air force is
unlikely to be fully translated into effective operational output as
a dichotomy between operational potential and political acceptance
still exists.
Note that the Netherlands—which did not have any major
politico-industrial obligations in European cooperative aircraft
programmes—has not placed a larger emphasis upon the forceenabling
component of air power. Instead, it has put a premium
upon acquiring state-of-the-art strike assets such as the AH-64
Apache. Kinetic assets are still seen as providing for a country’s
defence, whereas an overemphasis on force enablers is seen as role
specialisation—supposedly only providing a narrow bandwidth of
political options. The nation-state still dominates the shaping of
air power; this results in a significant imbalance between the shaft
and the spear, not only on a national level but particularly on a
European level. Despite the fact that, for instance, the procurement
of a limited number of C-17 Globemasters in the late 1990s
by a medium-sized European state would have generated an international
leverage out of proportion to the costs involved, this option
has not been pursued.
Different approaches to procurement lead to a further conclusion
concerning the importance of European air power cooperation.
Buying off the shelf, while promising cost-effective, shortterm
bargains, has not contributed to the buildup of European
strategic autonomy. In the case of France and to a lesser degree of
Germany, politico-industrial concerns were paramount over operational
requirements. In contrast, the Netherlands—with its
strong transatlantic orientation—has primarily equipped its Air
Force with sophisticated American equipment at relatively low
unit costs. Yet, in the absence of a European aerospace industry,
American suppliers might have had no incentive to offer their
products at a competitive price. Hence, it can be argued that the
Netherlands has indirectly benefited from a European aerospace
industry. Moreover, if Meilinger’s tenth air power proposition that