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The Quest for Relevant Air Power

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CONCLUSION │ 353<br />

trine, the chief of the <strong>Air</strong> Staff ordered the <strong>for</strong>mation of the RAAF<br />

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> Studies Centre in 1989, providing Australia with an<br />

edge in doctrine development in the post–Cold War era. In France,<br />

the opposite occurred throughout the 1990s. Attempts at <strong>for</strong>malising<br />

doctrine were primarily driven by exogenous factors, and<br />

the chief of the <strong>Air</strong> Staff considered <strong>for</strong>mal doctrine dogmatic,<br />

inhibiting innovative thinking. Only recently has doctrine development<br />

in France received top-level cover. Germany’s uneasiness<br />

with deployed offensive operations also might have led to a lack of<br />

top-down support <strong>for</strong> doctrine development. Only the defence re<strong>for</strong>m<br />

starting in 2002 put an end to doctrinal stagnation.<br />

In contrast, the Netherlands entered the post–Cold War era<br />

with the least historical and political baggage. Partly as a consequence<br />

of that and due to natural inclination, the RNLAF senior<br />

command was receptive to the importance of sound education<br />

and doctrine. As argued above, General Manderfeld regarded<br />

education as vital <strong>for</strong> operational effectiveness. His successor,<br />

General Droste, directly linked deployed operations to the need<br />

<strong>for</strong> adequate air power doctrine in his <strong>for</strong>eword to the RNLAF’s<br />

first published version of its air power doctrine in 1996. 9 In general,<br />

the RNLAF’s senior command echelon has been receptive to<br />

doctrine development as well as to education.<br />

<strong>The</strong> senior command’s attitude to doctrine also proved to be crucial<br />

in the case of the SwAF. Whereas the first and second attempts<br />

at developing a national air power doctrine were bottom-up approaches,<br />

only with sufficient top-down backing and resource allocations<br />

did the third attempt result in a published doctrine.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Continental European air <strong>for</strong>ces—particularly the senior<br />

command levels—have gradually recognised the value of air<br />

power doctrine in the post–Cold War era and have started to<br />

emulate their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. This is reflected not only<br />

in the air <strong>for</strong>ces’ doctrine development but also in the dissemination<br />

and teaching of air power thought. However, they have not<br />

yet come up with truly innovative thinking. As the air power conferences<br />

in Sweden and the Netherlands reveal, the Western air<br />

power debate is still dominated by Anglo-Saxon thinkers. Moreover,<br />

though the defence colleges in the Netherlands and Sweden<br />

developed rigorous air power reading lists <strong>for</strong> their students, none<br />

of the four air <strong>for</strong>ces has yet produced an intellectual air power

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