The Quest for Relevant Air Power

French Air Force │ 95
in Naples. Yet this proposal was not only rejected by the Americans
in late 1996 but also by Germany, France’s close ally in European
defence matters. As a result of these developments, Paris decided
to slow down rapprochement. This state of affairs made any
further Europeanisation of NATO less likely and threatened the
core objective France herself had sought within NATO. 76
After a period of stagnation in setting up a European defence
pillar, new momentum was gained at the Franco-British meeting
of December 1998 in St. Malo, France. As discussed in chap. 2,
both countries agreed that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous
military action. An agreement between Britain and
France was particularly important as both countries were considered
to possess the most relevant armed forces in Europe. 77 The
overcoming of obstacles between France and Britain laid the foundation
for the European Security and Defence Policy.
Moreover, despite tensions over the Iraq crisis in 2003, France
has reiterated its policy of rapprochement towards NATO and has
made significant contributions to the newly set up NATO Response
Force, with the logic that only a strong French commitment
can contribute to the alliance becoming more European. 78
The 2008 White Book announced France’s intention to renew
the transatlantic partnership. 79 In 2009 France finally returned to
NATO’s integrated military command structure. The reintegration
was underlined by France receiving two of NATO’s top military
positions—the post of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
(SACT) and the command of the Joint Command
Lisbon. 80 Yet on numerous occasions, the president and French
officials made it clear that French autonomy, particularly in the
domain of the country’s nuclear deterrent, would not be compromised
by this move, thereby retaining a certain degree of continuity
of Gaullist paradigms. 81
France’s return to NATO’s integrated military command structure
did not mean that the country would no longer put a premium
upon the European Union as a major actor in the domain of security.
Both the 2008 White Book and the military planning law 2009–14
declare that the EU has far-reaching inter national responsibilities,
including military ones. As such, its crisis management capabilities
were to be further reinforced to achieve a better task sharing in security
matters between Americans and Europeans. 82