The Quest for Relevant Air Power

168 │ GERMAN Air Force
nado combat aircraft; around 40 fixed-wing aircraft for SIGINT,
maritime reconnaissance, search and rescue (SAR), and liaison
purposes; and 19 Sea Lynx and 22 Sea King helicopters. 104 In 2002
these numbers had been reduced but nevertheless remained significant.
Army aviation still encompassed 566 helicopters. Along
with a considerable number of air-defence guns and MANPADS,
143 Roland SAM systems and 380 Gepard systems were still in the
service of the German Army. The Navy operated 43 helicopters
and 66 Tornado aircraft, amongst others. 105
It can be concluded that the defence budget allocation to air
power in general has been significantly more than the one-third
assigned to the GAF. In the period from 2007 onwards, this share
is growing, as the Eurofighter and A400M programmes are expected
to consume a significant percentage of the overall materiel
acquisition funds. 106 The Eurofighter has become the most expensive
programme of the German armed forces. 107 It is evident that
German decision makers perceive air power to be an effective military
instrument and that the even share placed upon air power
reflects German emphasis upon jointness.
Alliance Context
Germany’s postwar armed forces were not conceived as an instrument
of autonomous statecraft but as forces hinging upon allied
command structures. During the Cold War, German armed
forces—with the exception of a few territorial Army units—could
only accomplish their mission within the NATO chain of command.
Air defence forces were already during peacetime assigned
to the NATO commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe. 108
Germany thus deliberately transferred sovereignty on the use of
military force to NATO. With the Cold War over and the country
reunited, Germany did not depart from this defence policy orientation.
It not only insisted on integration into the Western Alliance
system but also added a new emphasis upon European integration.
109 These political paradigms were underlined by the 1992
Defence Policy Guidelines and by the 1994 Defence White Book.
The former identified European integration, including a European
defence identity, as well as the partnership with the United States
and the significant American military presence in Europe as vital
German interests. 110 The latter stated that the challenges of the