The Quest for Relevant Air Power

134 │ French Air Force
Before 2008 the FAF preferred to hinge upon implicit air power
doctrine rather than to publish an official strategic air power doctrine.
The highest echelons of the FAF considered formal doctrine
as dogmatic and inhibiting flexible thinking. Yet, given France’s
aspirations to lead-nation status in European defence matters, the
FAF was actually obliged to shape the European doctrinal landscape
and, hence, to come up with its own formal air power doctrine.
Furthermore, although Joint Forces Defence College participants
increasingly express their views in Penser les ailes françaises,
the college syllabus appears to focus upon staff work rather than
air power theory. They have not been exposed to an intense reading
programme of various air power literature. On the positive
side, the French were amongst the first to establish a joint staff college
in the post–Cold War era, taking account of the integrated
and complex nature of modern military operations.
Operation Desert Storm proved to be a watershed for the FAF
in the field of force structuring, as it blatantly disclosed conventional
shortfalls preventing France from making a contribution
congruent with its political objectives. Given France’s aspiration
to lead-nation status in coalition warfare, French officials and defence
planners realised that the FAF’s conventional equipment
had to be state of the art and fully interoperable with allied air
forces. In this respect, the FAF has put a premium upon the introduction
of NATO interoperable C2 systems and upon the buildup
of key capabilities such as CSAR. Moreover, France’s lead role in
the development of the MIDS Link-16 terminal is fully in line with
national strategic ambitions. Significant delays of major aircraft
programmes, however, have considerably constrained the FAF’s
reform. Interim solutions have mitigated capability gaps; however,
along with the growing maintenance costs of increasingly aging
materiel, they have also diverted resources from major programmes.
Gap-filling programmes such as the Mirage 2000-5 and
the Mirage 2000D had to be kept at the lowest possible level. Pending
introduction of the Rafale, the FAF had to rely upon a very
lean fleet of conventional state-of-the art combat aircraft throughout
the 1990s. A limited force of Mirage 2000D and Mirage 2000-5
aircraft arguably represented a subcritical conventional interim
force in light of French ambitions. Yet, less sophisticated aircraft
such as the Jaguar or the Mirage F1 proved indispensable through-