The Quest for Relevant Air Power

French Air Force │ 113
The first attempt in 1998 can be related to the Concept d’emploi
des forces (Concept for the Employment of the Armed Forces), published
in 1997. This joint document establishes the purpose of the
French armed forces according to the four strategic core functions
as identified in the 1994 Defence White Book—deterrence, prevention,
projection, and protection. 179 According to the 2006 study,
this first attempt represents the breaking down of the Concept
d’emploi des forces onto a FAF level and was hence entitled the
Doctrine d’emploi de l’Armée de l’Air (Doctrine for the employment
of the FAF). The writing of the document seems to have been restricted
to a small nucleus consisting of three colonels and a major
general. For unknown reasons, however, this air power doctrine
was not published. 180
The second attempt in 2003 can also be related to the publication
of a major joint document, the Doctrine interarmées d’emploi
des forces en opération (Joint Doctrine for the Employment of the
Armed Forces in Operations). It comes next in the doctrine hierarchy
after the 1997 Concept d’emploi des forces and sets guidelines
for the mode of employment of the French armed forces. 181 More
concrete than the 1997 concept, this joint doctrine devotes single
sections to certain key air power roles and characteristics but does
not come up with distinct French air power doctrine features. 182
As a response to this joint doctrine, FAF officers attending the
Joint Forces Defence College (Collège interarmées de défense
[CID]) in Paris were tasked with writing air power doctrine. However,
the hastily written document was not approved within the
wider FAF community, mainly due to concerns that an immature
document, compared to joint doctrine documents or foreign air
power doctrine manuals, might be detrimental for the FAF. 183
The 1998 and 2003 attempts at formalising French air power
doctrine were primarily driven by joint doctrine documents and
hence lacked sufficient internal motivation. There has, in fact, existed
an aversion towards formal doctrine as well as concerns,
raised by a former chief of the Air Staff and other officers during
interviews, that formal doctrine might be received as dogmatic
and thus inhibit innovative thinking and limit the room for manoeuvre
regarding both employment and resource allocation. 184
Despite, or perhaps because of, the lack of a formal air power
doctrine, it is interesting to note that in the air power periodical