The Quest for Relevant Air Power

POST–COLD WAR CHALLENGES │ 41
warfare came to the fore, and in the second half of the 1990s, the
term effects-based operations (EBO) began to dominate the doctrinal
debate. Both concepts imply that achieving strategic goals is
within the sphere of not only nuclear forces but also conventional
air power. PGMs proved so successful in Desert Storm that they
offset the need for mass attacks. Many different target sets could
be attacked simultaneously versus sequentially, hence, the term
parallel warfare. This approach has been thought to create paralysis
within the enemy system. 168
In the post–Cold War era, air campaign planners have also been
confronted with various peace support and coercive operations,
where pure military victory has not been the primary strategic
criterion. This situation has in turn led to the EBO debate in air
power doctrine circles. While during the Cold War, strategic effect
was relegated to the nuclear strike role, the term strategic had to be
extended in the 1990s to make it fit the new environment. 169 It no
longer connotes only the kinetic effect of air power but instead
refers to all of its roles. 170 According to current NATO air power
doctrine, it is the effect on the strategic objective that determines
the strategic nature of such operations (air operations for strategic
effect) and not the range, type of platform, or weapon used. 171 It
was further suggested that it was no longer useful to strictly distinguish
between tactical and strategic target sets: strategic effect
can be achieved by hitting targets such as fielded forces and their
logistics tail. 172
Air Power Doctrine Development
The USAF released its first post–Cold War basic aerospace doctrine,
Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, in March 1992. It superseded
AFM 1-1 from 5 January 1984 and served to usher the way into a
new air power era by formalizing the Gulf War air campaign lessons.
As such, it highlighted aerospace power’s inherent capability
to rapidly or simultaneously engage objectives at any level from
strategic through theatre to tactical, thereby embracing the concept
of parallel warfare, though not explicitly mentioning it. 173 It was
particularly Maj Gen David A. Deptula who conceptually established
the concept of parallel warfare in the ensuing years. 174 Strategic
attack was defined as “achiev[ing] maximum destruction of the
enemy’s ability to wage war.” 175 This definition implied a shift from a