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The Quest for Relevant Air Power

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GERMAN <strong>Air</strong> Force │ 205<br />

means to an end but also an end in itself, as it deepens alliance<br />

cohesion as well as European relations. Consistently, Germany has<br />

taken a leading role in European and transatlantic defence programmes<br />

such as the NAEW&CF, the A400M, or the Eurofighter.<br />

All current major defence programmes of the GAF are multilateral.<br />

As such, they decisively shape Europe’s defence landscape<br />

and further European integration as well as transatlantic cohesion.<br />

Given the requirements of deployed operations and the allies’<br />

expectation <strong>for</strong> increased German responsibility in international<br />

security matters, the GAF has gradually evolved into an<br />

increasingly balanced air <strong>for</strong>ce. Yet, it has to be underlined that<br />

the acquisition of a precision strike capability or AAR certainly<br />

represents an improvement, albeit from a very low starting point,<br />

and brings the GAF finally to a reach and strike standard that has,<br />

with the exception of air-launched cruise missiles, long been held<br />

by the RAF or the FAF. <strong>The</strong> GAF’s AAR capacity still falls short of<br />

British or French capacity levels. This shortfall is compounded by<br />

the German armed <strong>for</strong>ces’ general shortcomings in the area of logistics,<br />

as is highlighted by Germany’s NRF contributions. Due to<br />

logistics bottlenecks, the Army and <strong>Air</strong> Force can only make major<br />

contributions consecutively. Given these logistics and AAR<br />

shortcomings, theoretical plans to contribute up to 80 combat aircraft<br />

<strong>for</strong> potential EU operations appear too ambitious. Moreover,<br />

the GAF lacks the experience of deploying large numbers of combat<br />

aircraft to distant theatres. For Operation Allied Force, <strong>for</strong> instance,<br />

the GAF made available only 14 Tornados which could<br />

operate from well-prepared NATO air bases in Italy. Yet, a significant<br />

step in the GAF’s power projection capability can be expected<br />

with the introduction of the A400M transport aircraft.<br />

Germany and the GAF reacted to the offensive air power doctrine<br />

as demonstrated in Desert Storm with uneasiness. Only<br />

gradually did the GAF become involved in deployed operations.<br />

Though it has—due to political and constitutional restraints—<br />

contributed in a limited way to Western air campaigns, the GAF<br />

nevertheless proved to be a professional <strong>for</strong>ce that can seamlessly<br />

plug into highly complex air operations. In this regard, GAF participation<br />

in major integrated air exercises such as Red Flag or<br />

Maple Flag proved pivotal and made up <strong>for</strong> lack of experience.<br />

While the GAF has been gradually geared up <strong>for</strong> expeditionary

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