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The Quest for Relevant Air Power

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240 │ ROYAL NETHERLANDS <strong>Air</strong> Force<br />

operations across the spectrum of military <strong>for</strong>ce, and the RNLAF<br />

was able to respond effectively to the challenges of real operations.<br />

Overall, Desert Storm was not so much about a paradigm change,<br />

as in the case of the FAF, but a matter of recalibrating already existing<br />

Dutch defence capabilities. It is noteworthy that in doctrine<br />

development and the acquisition of an air-to-ground precision<br />

strike capability, Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force<br />

proved to be more critical <strong>for</strong> the RNLAF than Desert Storm (as is<br />

analysed later). Hence, there appears to be a difference between<br />

just observing an operation and fully participating in it.<br />

While the RNLAF could not immediately contribute to Desert<br />

Storm, it did so indirectly. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August<br />

1990, NATO decided to send Patriot units to Turkey <strong>for</strong> protection<br />

against Iraqi SCUD missiles. Two Dutch Patriot missile batteries<br />

were sent to Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey. This deployment<br />

was soon to be rein<strong>for</strong>ced with two more Hawk missile squadrons<br />

and Stinger units. <strong>The</strong> RNLAF also deployed a Patriot missile battery<br />

to Israel. 88 Whereas Dutch fighter aircraft were not able to<br />

participate in Operation Desert Storm, the rapid deployment of<br />

Patriot and Hawk missile units was a clear sign of the Netherlands<br />

government’s willingness to actively contribute to international<br />

crisis management. Moreover, Patriot deployments in the TBMD<br />

role fitted with NATO’s new extended air defence and rapid deployment<br />

concepts. With the Cold War over, the RNLAF’s guided<br />

missile units were withdrawn from the Deep Multi-Layered<br />

NATO Integrated <strong>Air</strong> Defence System in Germany and freed <strong>for</strong><br />

out-of-area operations. 89<br />

When Operation Deny Flight was launched on 12 April 1993,<br />

Dutch F-16s and US Navy F/A-18s flew the first CAP missions<br />

over Bosnia on the same day. A mere 10 days later, RNLAF F-16s<br />

were among the first to fly night CAP missions. <strong>The</strong> initial Dutch<br />

detachment consisted of 18 F-16s, roughly 10 per cent of the<br />

overall allied commitment to Operation Deny Flight. After the<br />

UN had authorised air-to-ground strikes including CAS in mid-<br />

1993, Dutch F-16s were prepared <strong>for</strong> the execution of these missions.<br />

<strong>The</strong> RNLAF’s fighter-bombers were basically configured<br />

<strong>for</strong> three roles—air defence, air-to-ground strikes, and tactical<br />

reconnaissance. 90 <strong>The</strong> first air strikes against ground targets by<br />

Dutch F-16 aircraft were conducted on 21 November 1994. <strong>The</strong>

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