The Quest for Relevant Air Power

CONCLUSION │ 357
“air power includes not only military assets but an aerospace industry
and commercial aviation” holds true, an aerospace industry
is a critical requirement for at least the larger European nations. 10
While the Netherlands’ approach has generated effective air
power at low costs, such an approach might paradoxically widen
the transatlantic air power capability gap in the long term if pursued
by the major European countries. On the one hand, a number
of European constituencies might become reluctant to spend large
sums on air power assets not produced domestically and on equipment
that can only be used effectively with US forces. On the other,
US suppliers might potentially become less inclined to sell their
products at competitive prices. To strengthen the transatlantic
partnership, Europe must be able to cover a significant spectrum
of the air power spectrum on its own. In this regard, European
cooperation is essential, as relevant European air power is no longer
a primarily national matter.
From a grand-strategic point of view, only approaches taking
into account the importance of a credible European aerospace industry
can serve a common European defence effort in the long
term. One British commentator argued that “it would be difficult
to envisage any credible European security policy in the second
century of air power without a credible aerospace industrial base
to sustain it.” 11 This does not imply that all specialised assets, such
as HALE RPAs, must be developed and manufactured in Europe.
In the post–Cold War era, technological advancements have
compensated for reductions and limited defence resources, particularly
through the increased attention upon multirole-capable
air power assets. A 1992 RAND study’s assumption that the number
of multirole squadrons would decline substantially did not
materialise at all—quite the opposite has been the case. 12 All major
Continental European air forces have primarily opted for singleseat,
multirole fighter-bombers. Technological trends in the manmachine
interface have made the single-seat fighter-bomber a viable
option. Despite this trend towards multirole aircraft, technological
niche capabilities in the areas of SEAD or TBMD have provided
single European air forces with leverage in deployed operations.
Technological trends have particularly played into the hands of
the RNLAF and have allowed it to overcome its limited defence
resources. In the 1980s highly sophisticated and specialised air-