The Quest for Relevant Air Power

POST–COLD WAR CHALLENGES │ 35
multaneously, British and French transport helicopters secured
the evacuation of wounded from the enclaves. 136
Allied Force. Between 24 March and 9 June 1999, NATO embarked
upon the last major air campaign over the Balkans with
the goal of stopping the suppression of the Albanian majority in
Kosovo. 137 It was widely assumed that Operation Deliberate Force
would serve as a pattern for Kosovo. Hence, NATO planned to
bomb only a specified number of selected targets. A short bombing
campaign was expected to make Slobodan Milosevic concede
to Western demands. However, there were two crucial differences
between Deliberate Force and Allied Force. First, in contrast to
Bosnia, Kosovo possessed special historical meaning for the
Serbs. 138 Second, a Croat and Muslim offensive was putting pressure
on the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, and there was a Western combat
component on the ground—both were lacking in 1999.
From the very beginning, an overwhelming force–type operation
was excluded. 139 Instead, NATO settled for a gradual approach
to coerce Milosevic. 140 Only in the second half of Operation Allied
Force did NATO strike with determination. 141 Undoubtedly, most
European allies would have been reluctant to approve a massive
use of force in advance. Yet, according to Ivo Daalder and Michael
O’Hanlon, the American charge that the air campaign was primarily
hampered by political interference from European NATO
member states does not carry substance. The decisions to adopt a
strategy of gradual escalation and to rule out the deployment of
ground forces were made in Washington, as it was believed—particularly
by Pres. Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright—that Milosevic would give in quickly. 142 Since the United
States and NATO had ruled out a ground option from the outset,
the Yugoslav Army was able to survive the air attacks by spreading
out and concealing its equipment. 143 Moreover, alliance friction
was created by the United States using a parallel but separate
mechanism for mission planning and air tasking regarding sensitive
systems such as the B-2, F-117, and cruise missile. While all
other alliance air assets were tasked by NATO, these systems were
tasked by the US European Command. 144
Why Milosevic gave in is still a controversial issue. A bundle of
factors was identified, with the air campaign at the core and underpinning
all the remaining factors—declining support from Russia,