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The Quest for Relevant Air Power

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POST–COLD WAR CHALLENGES │ 17<br />

signed in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in February 1992, the development<br />

of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)<br />

was agreed upon. At the time, the prospect of a future common<br />

defence was held out and an explicit link to the Western European<br />

Union (WEU) as an integral part of EU security and defence<br />

matters was established. 18<br />

Almost concurrently with these developments, WEU member<br />

states declared the necessity <strong>for</strong> a genuine European security and<br />

defence identity. 19 For this purpose, the WEU adopted in June 1992<br />

the Petersberg Tasks Declaration, encompassing humanitarian<br />

and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and peace en<strong>for</strong>cement. Moreover,<br />

WEU member states declared their intention to make available<br />

military units <strong>for</strong> the accomplishment of these tasks in the<br />

context of WEU, NATO, or EU operations. 20<br />

With the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1997, the<br />

European Council incorporated the WEU Petersberg Tasks into<br />

the EU’s CFSP. 21 Despite the declaration of broad political intentions,<br />

however, no firm and concrete action plan <strong>for</strong> common defence<br />

matters was decided upon. Moreover, Europe’s difficulties in<br />

dealing with the crisis in the Balkans during the 1990s seriously<br />

put into question the effectiveness of the CFSP. It was essential to<br />

improve European military capabilities if the EU wanted to take<br />

on strategic responsibilities. This realisation led Great Britain and<br />

France—the two critical European military actors—to reconcile<br />

opposing views. For France, a more effective use of military <strong>for</strong>ce<br />

meant a more pragmatic approach towards NATO. Great Britain,<br />

<strong>for</strong> its part, was apprehensive that Europe’s military powerlessness<br />

might imperil the very foundation of the Atlantic partnership.<br />

<strong>The</strong> rapprochement between France and Great Britain led to the<br />

bilateral Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in late 1998. 22 France<br />

and the UK jointly declared that the CFSP had to be backed by<br />

credible military <strong>for</strong>ces, decision-making bodies, and sources of<br />

intelligence and analysis. 23<br />

In the ensuing years, a rapid Europeanisation of the St. Malo<br />

Declaration took place. <strong>The</strong> institutional changes <strong>for</strong> an effective<br />

European security and defence policy as an integral part of the<br />

EU’s CFSP—decided at the summit in Cologne, Germany, elaborated<br />

on in Helsinki, Finland, and finalised at Santa Maria de<br />

Feira, Portugal—were agreed upon by the member states at the

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