The Quest for Relevant Air Power

GERMAN Air Force │ 187
publish a national strategic air power doctrine failed during the
1970s and 1980s, and NATO air power doctrine documents remained
the bedrock of German air power education. 228 This did
not mean, however, that the GAF did not operate according to
distinct national doctrinal features. For instance, while the 1984
USAF basic doctrine stated that the principal objective of each
service is to win the battle in its specific environment, the German
chief of the Air Staff argued in the late 1970s that there is “no independent
battle on land, in the air, or on the sea.” 229
Towards the late 1980s, however, supporters of a national basic
air power doctrine grew in number. 230 In March 1991, the GAF
finally published its first Air Force service instruction, LDv 100/1,
which corresponds to a basic doctrine document. The introduction
states that LDv 100/1 complements NATO doctrine documents
by elaborating on the fundamental nature of air power. 231
The document itself was doctrinally still anchored in the later
stages of the Cold War. While the role of aerial forces for alliance
defence, particularly in the context of flexible response, is dealt
with in depth, air power in support of peace support operations is
not treated. 232 Regarding the conduct of the air war, the document
reveals some specific German features. It argues, for instance, that
the primary goal is to gain a favourable air situation and not necessarily
air superiority. 233
In the ensuing years, the staff college in Hamburg made two
attempts to revise LDv 100/1. Yet, these attempts did not lead to
revised editions. This was partly due to the fact that NATO doctrine
documents were considered to provide a solid basis for the
conduct of national air operations. 234 Finally in late 2005, the
chief of the Air Staff ordered the 1991 edition to be revised. 235
The ongoing reform of the German armed forces highlighted the
need to doctrinally anchor the GAF. 236 National, NATO, and EU
documents provided the framework for the revision. Guidelines
for the GAF’s C2 structure and air policing were principally
drawn from national documents. For planning processes, however,
the instruction strictly adhered to NATO procedures since
the GAF had deliberately foregone implementing a national process.
The revised LDv 100/1 was primarily designed for staff officer
courses. 237 While it was issued in April 2009, it was not released
to the wider public. 238