NRO-MOL_2015

84 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
after he (Dr. Flax) had approved in each case, “with an
information copy simultaneously going to General Berg,”
and that the Director of Special Projects “must comply
with overall system integration and overall system
engineering instructions from General Berg concerning
the integration of the payload into the complete MOL
system,” etc. However, Dr. Flax also determined that,
since the DORIAN payload was “an NRO payload,”
General Martin would be held responsible to him “for
development, acquisition, and test, including decisions
as to the configuration of the payload. 15
The fact that he had little control over the payload
portion of the program remained troubling to General
Schriever. In October, at his direction, Evans and his staff
drafted a paper on the MOL organization to “clarify” the
management principles outlined in the 24 August plan.
Their view was that, unlike previous “black” projects,
where the reconnaissance sensor itself was “the major
element around which overall system integration is
postured,” MOL was different because of the introduction
of man into the system and because of “the currently
expressed national policy of overt and unclassified
admission of the existence of MOL.” Consequently, the
suggestion to conduct MOL as a covert program was
denied, although “conduct of covert activities within the
program itself” was not.
Because of this special nature of the program, they
argued that MOL was different from other NRO activities
and that the Director, MOL, was and should be responsible
for “all” its aspects. According to this interpretation
of the 24 August management plan, “guidance and
direction issued by Director, MOL is clearly competent
and authoritative, not only for the ‘white’ aspects of the
MOL program, but also for ‘black’ aspects—those which
interface with the NRP.” This was believed consistent
“with the spirit and intent of MOL management since
it would preserve a single, clear line of direction” and
permit integration of “black and white” guidance and
direction at the most effective management level. 16
The above viewpoints were submitted to Dr. Flax in
a paper titled “Procedural Considerations for MOL
Program Management.” Dr. Flax in turn asked General
Stewart, the Director of the NRO Staff, for his comments.
After reviewing the paper, General Stewart suggested a
number of changes and in a memorandum to General
Evans on 18 October 1965, he suggested that Generals
Berg and Martin also be asked to comment before a
proposed new management directive was submitted
to Flax and Schriever. In early November, after the
comments of Flax, Stewart and Berg were incorporated,
the “procedural considerations” paper was submitted to
General Martin for his comments and/or concurrence. 17
On 12 November Martin responded with a lengthy
critique sent to Dr. Flax and General Schriever, in which
he challenged and disagreed with the basic thrust and
intent of the paper. He argued that, in view of guidance
he had received from Dr. Flax, he retained complete
responsibility for development, acquisition, and test of
the MOL reconnaissance payloads in the same manner
as the other NRO payloads. He rejected the view that
MOL was different from other NRO programs because
of man’s presence or the policy of publicly admitting the
existence of the project. He said:
The MOL reconnaissance sensor
dominates the entire configuration of
this project. Its influence is far
greater than the presence - of man, even
in the “manned-only” configuration.
The requirement of manned/unmanned
capability further extends the
influence of the reconnaissance sensor
on the configuration of the project...
My present MOL responsibilities are assigned to me by
the Director, NRO, who has informed me that he holds
me responsible for carrying them out. I, therefore, cannot
agree with the “procedural principles’’ as written in the
draft. I submit that it is axiomatic that my direction should
come to me from the person to whom I am responsible
for carrying it out, with no intervening modification of
interpretation, and with no constraint on my direct access
to such person for questions, clarification, response or
discussion of such responsibilities and direction. 18
To ease some of the MOL Director’s complaints,
however, General Martin proposed adopting some
alternate procedure: which would be consistent “with
the present assignment of responsibilities. “Thus, for
example, he suggested that when Dr. Flax sent him
written guidance or direction, an information copy be
simultaneously provided to General Schriever. Copies of
messages and letters sent from his office to Flax similarly
would be dispatched to the MOL Program Office. 19
Martin’s stand killed the plan to change the existing
dual management structure. General Stewart, however,
argued informally with Evans that they would follow
the Martin-Berg arrangement. It was his view that all
MOL program direction should be issued by the MOL
Director, requiring only that instructions sent to Mart in
first have Dr. Flax’s (or his authorized representative’s)
concurrence, and that the flow of information upward
should go through the same channels. Subsequently,
General Stewart assigned Colonel Battle to General