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Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, <strong>MOL</strong> APPROVED<br />

31<br />

agencies also had agreed that, although it was under<br />

USAF management, NASA’s requests for participation<br />

in <strong>MOL</strong> would be recognized “to the extent that does<br />

not compromise the Air Force mission, in the same way<br />

that the Gemini has recognized the Air Force request for<br />

piggyback payloads... to the extent it doesn’t compromise<br />

the lunar landing priority and requirement.” 19<br />

The DoD-NASA <strong>MOL</strong> Agreement<br />

On 27 December 1963 Dr. Albert C. Hall, representing<br />

DDR&E, and Dr. George Mueller of NASA summarized<br />

in a joint paper their agencies’ views and agreements on<br />

<strong>MOL</strong> and ‘’the minimum elements of manned earth orbit<br />

programs.” They agreed that DoD requirements—”the<br />

early effective demonstration of man’s utility in performing<br />

military functions (for example, earth surveillance) from<br />

orbit”—would not be aimed at an operational “space<br />

station” in the context usually attributed to that term. They<br />

also agreed that NASA’s requirements would properly<br />

emphasize scientific and research aspects of orbital flight. 20<br />

In the paper, Drs. Hall and Mueller reviewed various<br />

possible system candidates for manned orbital flight and<br />

the OSD decision to select the Gemini/<strong>MOL</strong> approach.<br />

They agreed that continuing space agency studies might<br />

confirm NASA’s need “for a space station of proportions<br />

which will permit a centrifuge and/or require crew<br />

sizes of four or more.” They recognized that a national<br />

requirement might develop for a large orbiting station and<br />

agreed that both agencies would continue to coordinate<br />

their studies in that direction. Concerning management<br />

interfaces for the Gemini/<strong>MOL</strong>, they concurred that “if the<br />

Gemini B capsule is procured from the Gemini contractor<br />

that it should be procured through NASA’’ and that a<br />

coordinating board should be established to define the<br />

relationships and execute the necessary agreements.<br />

In summary, Drs. Hall and Mueller listed the following<br />

NASA- DoD agreements and conclusions:<br />

1. The Gemini B/<strong>MOL</strong> was a single military project<br />

within “the National Space Program” and was<br />

being implemented by DoD in response to military<br />

test requirements in preparation for possible<br />

requirements.<br />

2. DoD would initiate, under USAF management,<br />

a <strong>MOL</strong> program directed toward determining the<br />

military utility of man in orbit.<br />

3. DoD would make use of the NASA-developed<br />

Gemini, modified as required to be the passenger<br />

vehicle for the laboratory**.<br />

4. Titan III would be employed as the <strong>MOL</strong><br />

booster.<br />

5. NASA experimental requirements would be<br />

incorporated in the <strong>MOL</strong> Program.<br />

6. A Coordinating Board would be constituted to<br />

resolve Gemini B/<strong>MOL</strong> interface between DoD and<br />

NASA.<br />

7. The X-20 program would be cancelled in favor of<br />

the <strong>MOL</strong> Program.<br />

8. The ASSET program would be augmented by<br />

DoD.<br />

9. DoD and NASA would coordinate on an<br />

accelerated test program to determine the<br />

characteristics and suitability of various forms of<br />

maneuverable recovery vehicles.<br />

10. Both agencies would continue their study of<br />

requirements for large or operational type space<br />

stations and would utilize the AACB and its panels to<br />

coordinate these studies. 21<br />

11. In late January 1964 Drs. Brown and Seamans<br />

signed a DoD/NASA agreement authorizing the<br />

Air Force to negotiate a Gemini B design contract<br />

with McDonnell, provided that the arrangement did<br />

not set a pattern for any follow-on engineering and<br />

procurement contracts. A new contract would require<br />

NASA’s specific concurrence so as not to interfere<br />

with its Gemini program. ††<br />

** In late January 1964 Drs. Brown and Seamans signed a DoD/NASA<br />

agreement authorizing the Air Force to negotiate a Gemini B design contract<br />

with McDonnell, provided that the arrangement did not set a pattern for any<br />

follow-on engineering and procurement contracts. A new contract would<br />

require NASA’s specific concurrence so as not to interfere with its Gemini<br />

program. See Chapter XIII, History of <strong>MOL</strong>, Plans and Policies, Vol. II.<br />

†† See Chapter XIII, History of <strong>MOL</strong>, Plans and Policies, Vol. II.

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