NRO-MOL_2015
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Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, <strong>MOL</strong> APPROVED<br />
31<br />
agencies also had agreed that, although it was under<br />
USAF management, NASA’s requests for participation<br />
in <strong>MOL</strong> would be recognized “to the extent that does<br />
not compromise the Air Force mission, in the same way<br />
that the Gemini has recognized the Air Force request for<br />
piggyback payloads... to the extent it doesn’t compromise<br />
the lunar landing priority and requirement.” 19<br />
The DoD-NASA <strong>MOL</strong> Agreement<br />
On 27 December 1963 Dr. Albert C. Hall, representing<br />
DDR&E, and Dr. George Mueller of NASA summarized<br />
in a joint paper their agencies’ views and agreements on<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> and ‘’the minimum elements of manned earth orbit<br />
programs.” They agreed that DoD requirements—”the<br />
early effective demonstration of man’s utility in performing<br />
military functions (for example, earth surveillance) from<br />
orbit”—would not be aimed at an operational “space<br />
station” in the context usually attributed to that term. They<br />
also agreed that NASA’s requirements would properly<br />
emphasize scientific and research aspects of orbital flight. 20<br />
In the paper, Drs. Hall and Mueller reviewed various<br />
possible system candidates for manned orbital flight and<br />
the OSD decision to select the Gemini/<strong>MOL</strong> approach.<br />
They agreed that continuing space agency studies might<br />
confirm NASA’s need “for a space station of proportions<br />
which will permit a centrifuge and/or require crew<br />
sizes of four or more.” They recognized that a national<br />
requirement might develop for a large orbiting station and<br />
agreed that both agencies would continue to coordinate<br />
their studies in that direction. Concerning management<br />
interfaces for the Gemini/<strong>MOL</strong>, they concurred that “if the<br />
Gemini B capsule is procured from the Gemini contractor<br />
that it should be procured through NASA’’ and that a<br />
coordinating board should be established to define the<br />
relationships and execute the necessary agreements.<br />
In summary, Drs. Hall and Mueller listed the following<br />
NASA- DoD agreements and conclusions:<br />
1. The Gemini B/<strong>MOL</strong> was a single military project<br />
within “the National Space Program” and was<br />
being implemented by DoD in response to military<br />
test requirements in preparation for possible<br />
requirements.<br />
2. DoD would initiate, under USAF management,<br />
a <strong>MOL</strong> program directed toward determining the<br />
military utility of man in orbit.<br />
3. DoD would make use of the NASA-developed<br />
Gemini, modified as required to be the passenger<br />
vehicle for the laboratory**.<br />
4. Titan III would be employed as the <strong>MOL</strong><br />
booster.<br />
5. NASA experimental requirements would be<br />
incorporated in the <strong>MOL</strong> Program.<br />
6. A Coordinating Board would be constituted to<br />
resolve Gemini B/<strong>MOL</strong> interface between DoD and<br />
NASA.<br />
7. The X-20 program would be cancelled in favor of<br />
the <strong>MOL</strong> Program.<br />
8. The ASSET program would be augmented by<br />
DoD.<br />
9. DoD and NASA would coordinate on an<br />
accelerated test program to determine the<br />
characteristics and suitability of various forms of<br />
maneuverable recovery vehicles.<br />
10. Both agencies would continue their study of<br />
requirements for large or operational type space<br />
stations and would utilize the AACB and its panels to<br />
coordinate these studies. 21<br />
11. In late January 1964 Drs. Brown and Seamans<br />
signed a DoD/NASA agreement authorizing the<br />
Air Force to negotiate a Gemini B design contract<br />
with McDonnell, provided that the arrangement did<br />
not set a pattern for any follow-on engineering and<br />
procurement contracts. A new contract would require<br />
NASA’s specific concurrence so as not to interfere<br />
with its Gemini program. ††<br />
** In late January 1964 Drs. Brown and Seamans signed a DoD/NASA<br />
agreement authorizing the Air Force to negotiate a Gemini B design contract<br />
with McDonnell, provided that the arrangement did not set a pattern for any<br />
follow-on engineering and procurement contracts. A new contract would<br />
require NASA’s specific concurrence so as not to interfere with its Gemini<br />
program. See Chapter XIII, History of <strong>MOL</strong>, Plans and Policies, Vol. II.<br />
†† See Chapter XIII, History of <strong>MOL</strong>, Plans and Policies, Vol. II.