NRO-MOL_2015
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Introduction<br />
xv<br />
as determining the crew’s physical and mental viability in<br />
space for what were considered at the time very lengthy<br />
missions. The <strong>MOL</strong> program was nearly a decade ahead<br />
of the first space station mission of the Soviet’s in 1971.<br />
The <strong>MOL</strong> program also faced challenges of a terrestrial<br />
nature—the foremost being the Vietnam War. The<br />
challenge was that as the <strong>MOL</strong> program evolved so did<br />
the Vietnam War. The Johnson administration was trying<br />
to carry out its “Great Society” domestic programs as well<br />
as sustain an escalating war abroad. The prosecution of<br />
the Vietnam War directly resulted in delays in the <strong>MOL</strong><br />
schedule in order to reduce costs in the early years of<br />
the program and spread them into the future. President<br />
Johnson’s continued hope during his administration was<br />
that the Vietnam War could be concluded and American<br />
troops withdrawn to reduce costs associated with the war.<br />
Johnson failed to entice the North Vietnam government<br />
and its allies in South Vietnam to the negotiation table in<br />
order to achieve this end. As a consequence, national<br />
security programs not associated directly with the<br />
Vietnam program suffered in resource appropriation.<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> was one such program.<br />
Another significant challenge faced by the <strong>MOL</strong><br />
program was the lingering question of whether or not it<br />
really brought unique intelligence collection capabilities.<br />
The <strong>NRO</strong> had already demonstrated that space could be<br />
used successfully as a reconnaissance platform through<br />
the Corona, Gambit, Grab, and Poppy programs. At the<br />
time <strong>MOL</strong> was proposed, the <strong>NRO</strong> already had plans<br />
for a more powerful high-resolution Gambit program and<br />
the CIA was in the early stages of developing a satellite<br />
to supersede the Corona program, and they hoped, the<br />
Gambit program too. That program evolved into the<br />
<strong>NRO</strong>’s Hexagon program. The Hexagon program was<br />
designed to carry an immense film load, allowing it to<br />
stay on orbit for six months or more. It would also carry<br />
an improved targeting system. It promised versatility<br />
that called into question <strong>MOL</strong>’s necessity. Eventually,<br />
Hexagon and the improved Gambit-3 system would<br />
suffice in the Nixon administration’s view, leading to the<br />
<strong>MOL</strong>’s termination in June, 1969.<br />
The <strong>MOL</strong> Program Legacy<br />
Because of the <strong>MOL</strong> program size, complexity, and<br />
time in existence, it consumed many millions of dollars<br />
in funding before termination. This begs the question<br />
of what if anything did the United States gain from the<br />
program? There were significant legacy contributions<br />
from the program. The first and foremost significant<br />
contribution was the leadership that came from the<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> crew members trained under the program. Seven<br />
of those crew members were accepted into NASA’s<br />
astronaut program. At NASA they would either command<br />
or pilot the Space Shuttle. Of those, one would eventually<br />
lead NASA as the Agency’s administrator, another would<br />
command NASA’s Cape Canaveral launch facility,<br />
and others would lead elements of the NASA space<br />
program. Yet another would go on to lead the US’s<br />
Strategic Defense Initiative. Another would serve was<br />
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many would<br />
also play important roles in corporations supporting<br />
national defense and space programs. Other engineers,<br />
scientists, and staff would play key roles in other national<br />
reconnaissance programs, drawing on their experiences<br />
and insights gained from the <strong>MOL</strong> program.<br />
The <strong>MOL</strong> program would also make important<br />
contributions to national reconnaissance and space<br />
exploration programs. The Dorian camera system was<br />
to be preserved and studied for possible incorporation<br />
into Hexagon program. One of the options for reducing<br />
costs of the <strong>MOL</strong> program was a series of unmanned<br />
missions. Those missions would carry multiple filmreturn<br />
capsules in a configuration that closely resembled<br />
the configuration eventually developed for the Hexagon<br />
program. The <strong>MOL</strong> program also included a segmented<br />
mirror technology that was eventually used in a domestic<br />
space observatory. Segmented mirrors offered additional<br />
advances in space exploration with <strong>MOL</strong> advancing this<br />
important technology.<br />
Finally, <strong>MOL</strong> helped advance the technology and<br />
science necessary for longer space missions. For<br />
example, the <strong>MOL</strong> program required its crew members<br />
to travel through a narrow tube or tunnel from the Gemini<br />
capsule to the laboratory section once the vehicle was<br />
on orbit. This in turn required a flexible space suit—more<br />
so than what NASA had developed at the time. The<br />
advancements in space suits under the <strong>MOL</strong> program<br />
were transferred to NASA. <strong>MOL</strong> also included proposals<br />
for more than one space module being launched and<br />
then linked on orbit. This concept would be critical for the<br />
development of today’s multi module space craft on orbit<br />
such as the International Space Station. The research<br />
and technology developed under the <strong>MOL</strong> program for<br />
sustaining crew members on orbit was also transferred<br />
to NASA, undoubtedly aiding NASA’s advancements in<br />
manned space flight.<br />
There is often a misplaced assumption that a cancelled<br />
program has no important legacy. This should not be<br />
said of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program. For<br />
the reasons listed above, and others contained in the<br />
some 20,000 pages of documents associated with this<br />
compendium, the important contributions of <strong>MOL</strong> are<br />
clear. The <strong>MOL</strong> program should be recognized for its<br />
rich legacy in both civilian and national reconnaissance<br />
space histories.<br />
James D. Outzen<br />
Chief, Historical Documentation and Research<br />
Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance<br />
Chantilly, VA