NRO-MOL_2015

10 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
document as being submitted for approval in connection
with the fiscal year 1964 budget. He said that specific
recommendations would be forwarded separately. 29
On 9 November Zuckert submitted his recommendations.
He said he recognized the fiscal implications of the Five-
Year Space Program, but explained that it had been
deliberately prepared without regard to cost limitations.
In fiscal year 1964 alone, the proposed projects would
require $1 billion more than the amount tentatively
approved by OSD. The Air Force Secretary said that,
since such costs were unacceptable, he was limiting
his recommendations to four specific programs—Midas,
Saint, MODS, and Blue Gemini—with additional funds
required totaling $363 million in fiscal year 1964. Of this
amount, $75 million would be for MODS and $102 million
for Blue Gemini. Previously, no funds had been provided
for those projects. 30
Concerning MODS, Zuckert argued that it possessed
“distinct advantages beyond Dyna-Soar and the NASA
Gemini program” and would provide a useful vehicle
to help resolve some of the uncertainties concerning
military space applications. As for Blue Gemini, in which
the Air Force hoped to get some “stick time” in space,
he said it would be available at an early date and could
provide “an important and required steppingstone to
MODS.” While NASA’s Gemini operations would be
important for the general acquisition of information,
Zuckert said it could not substitute ‘’for actual Air Force
experience with the vehicle.” 31
Figure 16. Gemini Capsule Used by USAF
Source: NMUSAF
Tentative USAF planning at this time called for six Blue
Gemini launches beginning in May 1965. During the first
four flights, the Air Force would investigate and evaluate
manned space flight techniques and subsystems of
particular interest for MODS and other space operations.
There would be attempts to rendezvous and dock with
an Agena vehicle, inspection of an Agena in orbit, postdocking
maneuvers, and precise recovery. The final two
flights would concentrate on mission subsystem testing.
Each Blue Gemini pilot would first ride as a co-pilot on a
NASA Gemini flight.
In summing up his fiscal year 1964 recommendation,
Zuckert admitted that “certain items appear to be similar
to activities included in the NASA program.” However,
he argued that while this might be considered in some
quarters as ‘’duplication,” he felt it was essential to explore
alternate approaches and to exploit different techniques
to achieve effective, rapid progress in acquiring military
space capabilities. 32
The NASA-DoD Gemini Agreement
Figure 15. Zuckert and LeMay
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
Not unexpectedly, the Air Force’s proposals were
rejected in OSD. Defense officials objected not only
to the price tag, but also to the duplication between
USAF plans and projects already underway in NASA.
Secretary McNamara told a congressional committee
that the Air Force’s recommendations posed “a real
danger that two national programs will develop; one
in the Defense Department and one in NASA.” OSD’s
negative stand was discouraging to the Air Force, but an
important change had in fact occurred. McNamara and
his staff were now in general agreement that DoD—as