NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XIV - NEW FINANCIAL AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS 1967-1968
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missions, it noted, had resolutions of 21 inches with 20
percent having resolutions of more than 30 inches and 85
percent of all photos being four feet or more in resolution.
In the case of the KH-8—still in the development
phase—its photos were better than the mature KH-7
products. The report estimated that 93 percent of its
photos “would be superior to 24 inches only about six
percent of the time. On the other hand it declared that 99
percent of the MOL photos would fall in the better than
12 inch category and more than half would approach {an
even better} class, while under ideal conditions {the best
class of resolution} would be produced. The MOL report
concluded, therefore, that the DORIAN system would be
{many more} times as productive as photos in the 12
inch or higher class. 14
McNamara’s visit to Eastman Kodak took place on 14
September 1967. Flying to Rochester with him were
Drs. Foster, Flax, Brown, and several others. During the
flight he read the MOL Program Office report on “High
Resolution Photography” and, as Stewart later remarked,
“it apparently was the convincer that we needed the
{best resolution} product.” At Eastman Kodak, after
touring the facilities, and being briefed by various
officials, McNamara said that he had been concerned
about the program, “particularly since he had noted
an increase of 50 percent since the original estimate.”
He had wanted to assure himself on the status of the
program. He commented that the presentations were
excellent, he had received the information he required,
and he thanked everyone for their efforts. 15
The defense chief’s visit seemed to have been a
success. But the MOL program was still short $40
million in funds. At a staff conference on 28 September,
General Stewart remarked that the program faced “a
real crunch.” He said other R&D programs—such as the
C-5A and Minuteman III—were putting a squeeze on the
Air Force budget and, with the MOL Program expending
funds at the $480 million rate, unless an additional
$40 million was made available “we might have to go
unmanned.” However, the Vice Director went on to say
that he didn’t think it would “come to this because the
Air Force is emotionally committed to man in space.” 16
Despite its commitment, however, it was unable to come
up with even the $10 million Flax had earlier hoped to
reprogram. The fiscal year shortage came to $50 million.
At this juncture, both Dr. Brown and General McConnell
made informal requests to Chairman Rivers of the
House Armed Services Committee soliciting a $50
million increase in the DoD budget. They were turned
down, however. One reason—cited by Mr. Earl J.
Morgan, counsel of a House subcommittee headed
by Representative Melvin Price—was that Dr. Foster
had testified that $430 million would be adequate to
support the program. Morgan also remarked that the
Price subcommittee was “tired of getting the idiot’s
treatment” on MOL. A related reason, given by Mr.
John R. Blanford., Rivers’ chief counsel, was that the
tight security surrounding the MOL created problems
in the main committee. 17 The end result was that, when
Congress completed its work in October on the defense
appropriation bill for fiscal year 1968, the MOL was
allotted only the original $430 million requested by the
President in January.
The $50 million shortage required Air Force and
contractor officials to revise the schedule again. On 19-
20 October, Systems Office and contractor personnel
met to discuss the problem. Their tentative conclusion
was that “...an additional 12-week slip would have to be
incorporated into the program, pushing the first manned
launch date into 1971. However, they noted that even if
another 12-week slip was accepted, the MOL contractors
would be put into “an unacceptably exposed financial
position.” On 7 November Stewart directed Bleymaier to
develop an appropriate adjusted schedule which would
reduce or eliminate any contractor risk and which could
be used as a departure point for fiscal year 1969 and
1970 funding projections. 18
The Third Major Schedule Revision
of 1967
During late November and early December 1967 the
third major program and schedule revision of the year
got under way on the West Coast. On this occasion,
the frustrated associate contractors asked Air Force
officials to allow them to meet separately to devise a
program which would meet both the goals and financial
constraints placed upon MOL funding. The Air Force
agreed, whereupon the contractors during the week of
30 November through 6 December met at McDonnell-
Douglas’s Huntington Beach facility. On 7-8 December,
they submitted their revised MOL program to the Air
Force management. Surprisingly, they recommended
only minor changes and deletions in program content,
and proposed a schedule keyed to a first manned
MOL launch in August 1971. This schedule, which had
the unreserved indorsement of all the major associate
contractors, was based on the assumption that fiscal
year 1969 funding would total $661 million. 19 On 8
December, a MOL Program Review Council, chaired
by Dr. Flax, approved the proposed program revisions
(with some minor exceptions). Both the government
and industry were in agreement that they had a MOL
plan which was “technically and financially sound” and
promised to achieve all primary program objectives. 20