NRO-MOL_2015

160 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
in addition, would require approximately $550 million to
$575 million in fiscal years 1971 and 1972. If this proved
unacceptable, Stewart suggested continuing work on the
camera system only aiming toward a possible unmanned
application. In this case,.he would need up to $20 million
in fiscal year 1969 funds to terminate work on all MOL
contracts except for the camera. Another $200-$300
million would be needed in fiscal year 1970, depending
on whether a decision would be made to proceed with an
unmanned system. Still another option was to “terminate
the entire program.” This would require up to $30 million
in additional funds to pay termination costs during the
current fiscal year. 27
In a separate attachment on MOL funding experiences
and the schedule slips, Stewart remarked that:
FY 1970 will mark the third straight
year that MOL will have been funded
at a level $84 million or below
program needs for a reasonable
development pace, and the third
straight year that development will
have been stretched out and finances
manipulated on the premise that
adequate funding would be available
“next year.”
To minimize past development
stretchouts and their related net
increases in total program cost,
the MOL Program has gradually moved
toward an expenditure funding basis,
and the maximum non-critical work
(from a technological difficulty
standpoint) has been deferred as
far as possible into the future.
As a result, there is no financial
flexibility whatsoever in the program
and the planned future workflow
balance can be described as somewhat
marginal. 28
The above material was subsequently reviewed by
OSD and Air Force officials, as well as other possible
alternatives, including melding the DORIAN and
HEXAGON equipment into a single system. They finally
decided that a memorandum should be prepared for the
President in a final effort to save the manned system.
The draft of this memorandum, worked on by Drs.
Seamans and McLucas and General Stewart, sought
to make the point that astronauts in a manned system
would increase the likelihood of obtaining very high
resolution photographs sooner, that targets would be
covered in a more timely manner, and that the United
States would have additional flexibility not practical in an
unmanned system. 29
As reworked toward the end of April, the proposed
Laird memorandum to the President—sent to Packard
by Seamans—began :
Your expressed desire, as reported
by Mr. Mayo, that we fund MOL at
less than the $525 million now
requested of the Congress for FY
1970 has resulted in our making a
careful reappraisal of the program.
I conclude that we either should fund
MOL at a level commensurate with
reasonable progress for the large
amounts involved, or terminate the
overt manned MOL program and continue
only the covert very high resolution
(VHR) camera system toward future
use in an unmanned satellite... 30
Meanwhile, General Stewart—who had become
quite pessimistic about prospects for survival of the
program—began drafting letters to be sent by Laird to
chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees announcing MOL’s
termination. He also wrote draft letters to be forwarded
for Senators and Representatives from states that would
be most seriously affected by termination. 31
While these activities were underway in the Pentagon,
Budget Director Mayo and his staff were writing their
own memorandum to the President urging that MOL be
terminated. In this memorandum, which Mayo submitted
to the President on 21 April 1969, he recalled that Mr.
Nixon—before making his decision on the 9th (to terminate
HEXAGON and slow down MOL)—had reviewed the
option of “continuing the HEXAGON search system and
the cancellation of MOL.” On reflection, Mayo wrote,
there might be additional reasons for reconsidering this
option. “Politically,” ‡‡ it might be desirable “to have the
better performance of the HEXAGON search system to
provide greater assurance, for example, to members
of Congress who would be most concerned about our
ability to police a strategic arms limitation agreement.”
In terms of added intelligence value, he said, “the MOL
is the more questionable. Cancellation of MOL and
continuation of HEXAGON would provide about the
same savings below the presently proposed programs,
both in FY 1970 and over the next five years, as your
current decision.” 32
‡‡ Mayo’s emphasis.