NRO-MOL_2015

112 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
because they required long lead times. §§ Based on the
approval already granted, Evans suggested there was
clear “intent and willingness” on the part of OSD “for
the Air Force not only to proceed with the Engineering
Development Phase but also to protect development
lead-time where necessary.” The only limitation or
hindrance to going into full engineering development on
all MOL segments was the funding deficit in 1967 and
subsequent years. In view of the above, Evans urged
Drs. Brown and Flax to authorize the MOL Program
Office to proceed with engineering development. 33
On 20 August Secretary Brown accepted the above
recommendation. He authorized the MOL Program
Office to obligate fiscal year 1966 and 1967 funds at
the necessary rate to protect development lead time
with requirements for 1967 funds being limited to $208
million. He said this authorization would apply “only until
program approval for full-scale development and, in
any event, will not apply beyond January 1, 1967.” He
asked that every effort be made to hold 1967 funding to
a minimum, consistent with the primary objective for the
first manned flight. 34
October with the firm cost data you require to support a
decision on full-scale development of the MOL . Prior to
the decision, I will continue to protect the flight schedule,
within the funding constraints you have stipulated.’’ 37
In the meantime, on 25 August 1966, the MOL Program
Office received good news from Capitol Hill, where a
Joint House-Senate Conference approved a compromise
appropriation of $50 million to be added to the $150
million requested by the President in his January budget.
The gift came on the first anniversary of the President’s
announcement that the United States would proceed with
the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program and brought
the total fiscal year 1967 appropriation to $228.4 million. 38
Whereupon General Evans on 30 August directed Berg
to continue his negotiations with all major contractors
in accordance with the flight objectives and schedules
defined in the Program Plan and Funding Requirements
document. He was requested to prepare a briefing on
total program costs resulting from these negotiations,
and was authorized to obligate 1966 and 1967 funds
as needed to protect schedules and development
lead times, up to 1 January 1967. He also advised
that, pending a review by higher authority of the final
negotiated program costs, authority to proceed with fullscale
MOL development would be withheld. 35
General Berg took immediate steps to implement this
directive. His office issued “pre-contract” cost letters to
Douglas, General Electric, and McDonnell for the month
of September 1966, limiting them to expenditures of $4.0
million, $2.0 million, and $1.789 million respectively. To
provide contractual coverage for the above, the MOL
Systems Office planned to negotiate amendments
to Phase IC contracts to cover this interim effort until
engineering development contracts were approved. 36 In a
report to Dr. Brown on the above actions, General Evans
advised that he hoped to be able to provide him “by late
§§ As noted, in early April 1966 the Eastman Kodak facilities/equipment
package was approved by DDR&E. Subsequently, on 1 August, a
$258,471,000 negotiated contract for the sensor engineering development
phase was awarded the contractor. In the case of Titan IIIM, in early 1966
the four contractors involved were provided $20 million in 1966 funds to begin
engineering design and some hardware development. They were: Martin
Marietta Corp., United Technology Center, Aerojet General Corp., and AC
Electronics Division of General Motors.
Despite the fact that “full-scale” MOL development was not authorized,
and only segments of the program were fully funded, the date of 1 September
1966- which Berg had suggested the previous December as the date for
initiating Phase II—was adopted by the MOL Program Office as the official
start of engineering development.