NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XV - THE PROJECT TERMINATED
159
would provide in fiscal year 1972 most of the information
on important weapon system characteristics discernible
through photography. As for DoD’s claim that MOL could
help police a strategic arms limitation agreement, it
stated that existing unmanned systems were capable
of detecting changes in enemy weapon system
deployments. Further, it argued that the more subtle
qualitative improvements in enemy missiles—”such as
accuracy/vulnerability (hardness, reliability and yield and
type of warheads)”—were difficult to discern, “even with
{higher resolution} photography. 22
BOB also challenged—on the basis of GAMBIT-3
experience—the Air Force claim that the MOL would
“achieve its goal for best resolution of {better than one
foot.} If it failed, then “the improvement over GAMBIT-3
would be even more marginal.” The savings provided
through MOL’s termination, it argued “would provide
additional flexibility in future budgets to pursue other
manned space projects or new types of intelligence
capabilities such as warning...” The BOB rationale again
cited the position taken by the CIA to back up its claim
that, while MOL photography would be useful, it was not
worth the very large cost involved. 23
of the need for convincing evidence
when the President was reluctant to
act on the basis of U-2 photography
{...} but did act when low-level
reconnaissance aircraft {photography}
was secured... 24
Before this issue paper was submitted to Mr. Nixon,
Secretary Laird announced a further reduction of the
program’s 1970 budget. On 2 April 1969 he informed
the House Committee on Armed Services that he was
reducing MOL’s budget from $576 million to $525
million. “A careful review of the work done to date,”
he said, “has convinced us that a total of six launches
would probably be enough to accomplish all of the
approved objectives. The elimination of one launch
will save $20 million. The remaining reduction of $31
million will simply stretch out the program and delay the
first launch by two to three months.” 25
OSD’s rebuttal, which would go forward with the BOB
recommendation to the President, touched on many
of the points previously made. Among other things, it
argued that:
MOL photography alone will enable the
production of performance estimates
of foreign weapon systems that are
{several} times more accurate and
2-3 years sooner than from current
all-source intelligence. Certain
important performance parameters and
characteristics of foreign weapons,
systems, facilities and equipment
can be derived with reasonable
accuracy, timeliness and confidence
from VHR imagery alone...
MOL photography will be of
considerable value in any strategic
arms limitation agreement (along the
lines of those now under discussion
with the USSR) to provide very high
confidence that the Soviets either are
adhering to or violating the terms of
the Treaty, and further to provide
additional technical intelligence on
subtle weapon improvements. The 1962
Cuban missile crisis is illustrative
Figure 59. HEXAGON on Factory Floor
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
This decision, however, was soon made academic.
On 9 April—after reviewing the BOB/DoD Issue Paper
with his budget chief—the President decided to reduce
MOL FY 1970 funding to $360 million. Mayo passed this
information along to Laird and also advised Helms that the
President also had decided to terminate the HEXAGON
unmanned photographic satellite development to save
money †† . 26 The next day Dr. Foster requested Stewart to
prepare suitable material that he and Dr. McLucas might
use during a meeting with Laird or Packard on 14 April.
On 11 April Stewart forwarded to McLucas a lengthy
paper prepared by his staff on the effect of a $360
million budget cut on the MOL schedule. It would
delay the first manned flight as much as one year and
increase total program costs at least $360 million and,
†† The HEXAGON system was initiated in 1964-1965 as a proposed
replacement for the CORONA search system and as a possible partial
substitute for the GAMBIT-3 spotting or surveillance system. The CIA was a
strong proponent of this system.