NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XII - CONGRESS, MOL SECURITY AND THE RANGE CONTROVERSY
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Seamans responded that a “national decision” had
been made to launch certain operational programs
from Vandenberg into polar orbits and to use the ETR
for equatorial orbits. He noted that NASA planned to
launch operational weather satellites from the West
Coast because they required polar orbits. Gurney asked
whether NASA and DoD had coordinated on studies
comparing MOL launches from both ranges. Seamans
said he was aware such work was under way but
NASA was not involved and General Schriever would
be a better person to ask. He remarked further that to
launch into polar orbit from Cape Kennedy required a
“dog leg” in the initial boost phase. Such a maneuver, he
concluded, was “scarcely within the [weight] limitations
of the Titan IIIC/MOL. 14
The next day, 8 February, the committee reconvened
with General Schriever in the witness chair. Once again
Chairman Miller cautioned the members “their interest
did not lie in the mission of MOL” and that they should
concentrate on NASA/DoD possible duplication of
efforts. After opening the meeting, Miller left the room
and Schriever began reading a lengthy paper to the
committee. He gave the history of the MOL program,
described the system, and reported on planned
schedules, the MOL booster, life support system,
tracking stations, etc. He ended his statement with a
review of Defense Department policy requiring mutual
exchange of information and cooperation with NASA on
their individual space projects. 15
After he had answered various questions dealing with
the program, Congressman J. Edward Roush of Indiana
finally asked the “forbidden” one: “What is the ultimate
purpose of MOL and why is it that everything the Air
Force is doing cannot be done by NASA?” Schriever
replied that the mission was military in nature, was not
of interest to NASA, and did not fall within the space
agency’s area of responsibility. At this point Chairman
Miller returned to the hearing room and remarked: “It is
not necessary to ask this type of question if you have
confidence in the U.S. military.” 16
When Congressman Gurney was recognized by the
Chairman, he began his interrogation by proclaiming
himself as a strong advocate of military man in space.
However, he reminded the MOL Program Director that the
Air Force had invested “$150 million” in its Cape Kennedy
launch facility, which he claimed it was abandoning. He
noted that polar launches had already been made from
the Cape, that NASA was planning a polar orbit manned
mission from that site, § and he challenged Schriever
about the Air Force’s “exaggerated’’ safety requirements
for ETR polar flights.
General Schriever replied by reminding the committee
that several years before a Thor missile launched from
the Cape had impacted on Cuban soil. He admitted that a
polar orbit was technically feasible from the Eastern Test
Range but said there was a weight penalty which made it
impractical for MOL. The Air Force, he said, had initiated
a study on possible MOL launches from the ETR, but he
said that “if you attempt the launching in the necessary
180 to 185 degree direction, it will fly over Miami and
Palm Beach. Neither the Saturn IB or Titan IIIC can
make the turn necessary for a safe polar launching and
still boost the full MOL payload into orbit.” He said he
would submit to the committee information on the exact
loss of payload weight during such a maneuver. 17
Following this statement and other questions and
answers on possible duplication between the Air Force
and NASA space programs, another Congressman—
Representative William F. Ryan of New York—insisted
Schriever explain the mission of the MOL. Once
again, Chairman Miller interjected with a reminder
that the committee would not inquire into the mission.
Whereupon, Ryan asked why NASA couldn’t accomplish
all that the Air Force planned to do? Schriever answered
that the 1958 Space Act had definitely stated that the
Department of Defense would be responsible for military
applications in space and “the MOL program is definitely
a military application. 18
Schriever’s testimony concluded the executive hearings
of the House committee. With the important help of its
chairman, the problem of a breach in MOL security was
overcome and the question of duplication apparently
answered to the satisfaction at least of Congressman
Miller. Thus, he stated to a press representative that
he felt there was no major duplication of effort between
MOL and NASA’s Apollo Applications program. He also
declared he supported the Air Force’s decision to launch
the MOL from Vandenberg. Cape Kennedy, he said,
was the best site for near equatorial launchings, but the
Western Test Range was best for polar orbit launches. 19
§ At this time NASA was considering possible polar orbit launches from
Cape Kennedy, whenever the reliability of the Saturn IB launch vehicle was
established.
The fact that Chairman Miller was a Californian certainly did not, of course,
hinder the program.