NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter VIII - THE MOL PROGRAM DECISION 25 August 1965
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if they proceeded, they should be prepared to assume
“serious political risks” when the flight tests began.
However, he said:
We should give consideration at the
highest level to the contingencies
which may occur so that one day we
are not caught by surprise by the
intensity of the reaction abroad
as we were when the U-2 was shot
down over the USSR. It is true that
unmanned satellite reconnaissance
has been used and accepted by both
sides. However, it is possible that
manned satellite surveillance could
be considered ‘overflight’ with all
its connotations. It is also possible
that MOL will be construed by the USSR
as a weapons system in space capable
of launching bombs from orbit. We
must certainly consider how likely
it is that such an interpretation
could be made, whether the leaders of
the USSR could tolerate the existence
of MOL if such an interpretation is
made, and what their reaction might
be... 7
On the other hand, Dr. Hornig noted that manned
activities in orbit had become somewhat routinely
accepted over the past years and it was possible that
MOL would also achieve acceptance if introduced to
the public in a careful manner. If so, it might make a
Figure 39. Gambit-3
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
substantial contribution to the recognition of manned
observation and surveillance as a normal mode of
international behavior. He therefore recommended to
the President that high level political oversight be given
to: (1) the extent to which the public should be informed
about MOL and the method by which the program was
announced “so that we establish, right from the start,
a picture of MOL which will give it the best chance of
gaining acceptance by the international community,” and
(2) the contingencies that might arise if the flights were
not accepted and the detailed plans for meeting those
contingencies if they occurred. 8
The Budget Bureau Expresses Doubt
After Sectary McNamara’s staff received the Air Force’s
MOL program proposal and Dr. Hornig’s comments,
Colonel Clarence L. Battle, Dr. Hall’s assistant in
ODDR&E, began composing a memorandum on
the subject for Secretary McNamara to send to the
President. Col Battle’s draft memorandum was reviewed
by Dr. Brown, who made a number of changes in it and
then forwarded copies to Mr. Charles L. Schultze § , the
Director of the Budget, Adm. William Raborn, Director of
the CIA, and Vice President Humphrey, chairman of the
National Aeronautics and Space Council.
On 8 July 1965 Schultze forwarded his comments to
the Vice President and McNamara and questioned
whether MOL’s superiority as a reconnaissance system,
as compared to a possible unmanned system, was worth
the $1 billion of additional development costs and $200
million of additional annual operating costs. “I think,” he
said, “we must satisfy ourselves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the probable superiority of the manned over
the unmanned system is likely to be worth the additional
cost before recommending to the President that the
program proceed.” 9
The budget chief noted that the existing unmanned
systems “have made and can continue to make
essential, significant and spectacular contributions
to intelligence and national security.” He pointed out
that the latest version, GAMBIT-3—which was under
active development—was expected to provide {better
than one foot} resolution at a development cost of
same $200-300 million while an even better product
{...} might be obtained with an improved unmanned
system at a development cost of $600-800 million. On
the other hand, he said, MOL would cost $1.6 billion
more and it was not clear to him that {the promised}
resolution photography had that much additional value
for national security.
§ Schultze succeeded Kermit Gordon on 1 June 1955