NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter IV - PLANNING THE MANNED ORBITNG LABORATORY December 1963-June 1964
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Planning the Manned Orbiting Laboratory
December 1963-June 1964
The MOL decision made, the Air Force in December
1963 began an arduous effort stretching over many
months to define its primary objectives, identify the
military experiments the astronauts would perform, and
study the kinds of equipment and subsystems needed.
This work began after Dr. Brown forwarded detailed
program guidance to the Air Force on 11 December.
According to his instructions, the basic purpose of the
Manned Military Orbiting Laboratory (MMOL)* was to
assess the military utility of man in space. Since man
was not considered useful unless he performed a variety
of tasks in space, MOL equipment was to be chosen
both to support the astronaut and challenge his flexibility
and judgment. DDR&E visualized the following type of
manned orbital activity:
(The) astronaut will carry out
scientific observations of both space
and earth. He will adjust equipment
to ensure its maximum performance. He
will maintain the repair equipment.
He will be measured to see if he is
capable of coping with the unusual—
either in his observation or in his
equipment operation. Indeed, it is
planned that he will be challenged so
severely that room in the laboratory
must be planned to provide minimum
elements of personnel comfort such
as rest, exercise, and freedom from
the confinement of a space suit. 1
Accordingly, Dr. Brown suggested the Air Force design
military test equipment and adopt procedures to measure
the degree of improvement that could be achieved
by employing man in space. Since reconnaissance
was considered a logical mission, he proposed the
Air Force install camera equipment in the laboratory
module to provide “threat warning intelligence.” To test
the astronauts’ capabilities, he suggested that targets
simulating key enemy localities be transmitted to them
and they be required to respond to emergency requests
for information by locating and photographing these
points, performing on-board processing and photointerpretation,
and transmitting the data to earth. Much
of the above proposed test activities, he said, could be
simulated on the ground or in aircraft.
* At the request of President Johnson, the word “military” was later dropped.
In addition to using photographic equipment, he
suggested the Air Force install an optical viewer in
the MOL having a sufficient field of vision to allow an
astronaut to search for targets of opportunity, identify
them, and report in real time. He thought that several sets
of high quality direct optical equipment would be needed.
He suggested that tests also might be performed with an
infrared system using a variety of wave lengths to help
determine the operator’s ability to interpret data, optimize
the signal and identify the greatest sources of noise, and
report receipts of signals from ballistic missiles, ships,
ground installations, and other sources. He believed it
might be demonstrated that infrared systems became
operationally feasible only by using “the discriminatory
intelligence of man in the loop. 2
Besides possible experiments and equipment to be
used, Brown’s instructions also covered a number
of other program areas. He directed the Air Force to
make the maximum use of NASA’s control facilities at
Houston † and the worldwide tracking network built for
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Concerning
procurement of Gemini B, he asked the Air Force to work
through NASA officials if the changes required to adapt
the capsules to MOL were of a minor nature. If major
modifications were required, he said the Air Force would
be authorized to deal directly with McDonnell. Funding to
support this preliminary study and development planning
effort was set at $10 million for fiscal year 1964 and $75
million for fiscal year 1965.
In his covering memorandum to the above program
guidance, Dr. Brown asked the Air Force to submit a
development plan to OSD by year’s end and he further
stated:
The degree of success of the MOL
Program is certain to have national
importance. The nature of the
cooperative effort with NASA will
require decisions that must be made
by the Secretary of Defense. In
recognition of these conditions, the
DDR&E will expect to have a larger
measure of direct involvement than
is the usual case. In working out a
plan for Air Force/DoD relations,
the Air Force should recommend a
† This proposal was discussed but never implemented.