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18 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents On 9 August McNamara forwarded a three-page letter to the Vice President which was, from the Air Force viewpoint, very gratifying indeed. The Secretary declared that an investigation of the role of military man in space was important to national security and that an orbital space station would help determine military utility. The station could serve, he said, as a laboratory and development facility to devise techniques for long duration life support and to test equipment for both manned and unmanned military missions. He said it was possible “to conceive of significant experiments and tests to improve our capability in every type of military operation where space technology has proven, or may prove, useful. 16 In addition to its potential as a laboratory and development facility, Secretary McNamara stated: Figure 19. Michael I. Yarymovych Source: CSNR Reference Collection Meanwhile, the AACB’s Manned Space Flight Panel completed its review of NASA-DoD coordination and concluded that a formal exchange of information between the two agencies should be increased. On 27 June the panel suggested to the Board that data furnished include brief descriptions of projects (AF Forms 613 and NASA Task Descriptions), studies of supporting technology, significant in-house efforts, RFP’s, work statements, contractor proposals, and final study reports. The panel agreed that significant meetings related to specific studies should be open to four observers from each agency. 14 McNamara’s Report to Vice President Johnson The advantages of acquiring a national space station were being reviewed at this time not only in the government but also in various technical and professional journals. In July 1963, Air Force Magazine discussed in great detail the Air Force’s MODS concept and NASA’s proposed Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) in an article titled, “The Case for an American Manned Space Station.” Perhaps coincidentally, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), on 22 July asked Secretary McNamara to submit a paper to him “expressing the possible uses of space stations in maintaining our national security.” He also requested Administrator Webb to submit his ideas as to the manner in which a future space station development project should be approached. 15 ... there is the probability that it will evolve into a vehicle which is directly used for military purposes. It may provide a platform for very sophisticated observation and surveillance. Detailed study of ground targets and surveillance of space with a multiplicity of sensors may prove possible. Surveillance of ocean areas may aid our antisubmarine warfare capabilities. An orbital command and control station has some attractive features. While orbital bombardment does not appear to be an effective technique at the moment, new weapons now unknown may cause it to evolve into a useful strategic military tool as well as a political asset. 17 McNamara reported that the Defense Department had studied the space station concept for several years and “expected soon to approach industry with a Request for Proposal on a detailed pre-program definition study of an orbital space station.” Data obtained from this study would permit OSD to determine the course of development and to start a program definition phase, “should a decision be made to proceed.” Although he was not ready to make a recommendation, McNamara advised that the orbital space station program, if undertaken, would require a new national mission “to be assigned by the President on behalf of all national interests. 18 Webb submitted his statement to the Vice President, also on 9 August. The space agency recognized, he said, “that an experimental Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) project, a mandatory forerunner of any long-
Chapter II - A National Space Station 19 duration manned space operational system, would be a major undertaking. “NASA and DoD”, he said, were conducting exploratory studies of a MOL, both inhouse and through contracts, and coordinating their efforts under the aegis of the AACB. After determining the national need for a MOL and evaluating various concepts, he proposed the two agencies submit to the President via the Space Council a recommendation “as to the management responsibility based on predominant interest and consideration of other pertinent factors, such as management competence, relation to other programs in progress, and international and political implications. 19 A New NASA-DoD Space Station Agreement Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara concluded that “a mere exchange of information” between DoD and NASA would be insufficient. Noting the Manned Space Flight Panel’s report of 27 June to the AACB (cited above) had urged an increased exchange of data between the two agencies, McNamara suggested to Webb that they “now agree to a more formal coordination in this field.” Toward this end, he submitted a draft agreement between DoD and NASA concerning studies of manned orbital test stations and requested Webb’s signature. 20 On 8 August Dr. Brown, in accordance with the above draft agreement, forwarded to NASA the Air Force’s proposed study entitled “National Orbital Space Station (NOSS) Pre-Program Definition Study” and requested the space agency’s concurrence. He reported approximately $1 million would be spent on the study in fiscal year 1964. On 23 August, NASA approved the study and expressed the opinion that it would be useful in defining the military potential of such a space station. 21 On 23 August NASA also forwarded to DoD three proposed space station studies it planned to pursue and requested concurrence. They included a $3.5 million Phase II MORL study, a $200,000 Early Apollo Research Laboratory investigation, and a $200,000 Biomedical and Human Factors Measurement System study for a manned orbital laboratory. Asked by OSD to comment, the Air Force generally concurred in all the NASA study efforts up to final design and fabrication of mock-ups. It pointed out, however, that the final results would probably not be representative of national space station program candidates since DoD requirements were not being considered and would not be available until early in 1964 from the NOSS study. 22 Webb, meanwhile, agreed with McNamara’s view that the existing exchange of information was insufficient. However, he disagreed with the approach suggested in the DoD draft agreement. It did not take into account, he said, “some very important complexities which we both face in endeavoring to obtain the maximum of cooperation between the Department of Defense and NASA.” He cited his previous agreement to submit studies which NASA proposed to make and to “fund in any area in which DoD was interested.” Prior to such submission, he proposed a procedure under which officials of both agencies would coordinate to insure that the study, when submitted, included “those things which you and your colleagues regard as important and exclude those things which you may believe unnecessary.” With the above in mind, Webb submitted an alternative agreement to cover the entire approach to a possible new manned orbital space station project. 23 In brief, NASA’s proposed agreement provided that: (1) advanced exploratory studies on a space station would be coordinated through the AACB; (2) upon joint evaluation of the studies, the Secretary of Defense and the NASA Administrator would make a joint recommendation to the President as to the need for such a project, including a recommendation as to which agency should direct the project; (3) if a decision were made to proceed with space station development, a joint NASA-DoD board would formulate the detailed objectives and specify the nature of the experiments to be conducted. On 16 September 1963, McNamara accepted and signed the alternative agreement, although he still had “certain reservations.” In a letter to Webb, he said his greatest concern was to insure that the requirements and design constraints of each agency could be fully incorporated from the beginning. As an example of the type of problem confronting them, McNamara cited NASA’s proposed contractor effort for design of a Manned Orbital Research Laboratory at a cost of $3.5 million. I believe that an effort of this magnitude is premature by eight months to a year since it will not be possible prior to that time for us to provide properly for the incorporation of Defense Department judgments and thoughts on military requirements into the design. You must realize that if on-going DoD studies provide justifiable military objectives for a space station development, there may
Page 1: The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
Page 4: Center for the Study of National Re
Page 7 and 8: Contents v Contents Foreword.......
Page 9 and 10: Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
Page 11 and 12: Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
Page 13 and 14: Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
Page 15 and 16: Introduction xiii President Lyndon
Page 17 and 18: Introduction xv as determining the
Page 19 and 20: Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
Page 33 and 34: Chapter II - A National Space Stati
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Page 43 and 44: Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
Page 52 and 53: Chapter IV: PLANNING THE MANNED ORB
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Page 64 and 65: Chapter V: EVOLUTION OF THE MOL MAN
Page 68 and 69: Chapter VI: RESULTS OF THE PRE-PHAS
Page 76 and 77: Chapter VII: THE LABORATORY VEHICLE
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Chapter VIII: THE MOL PROGRAM DECIS
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Chapter IX: ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT
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Chapter X - THE MANNED/UNMANNED SYS
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Chapter XII: CONGRESS, MOL SECURITY
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Chapter XV: THE PROJECT TERMINATED
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Chapter XVI: POST-MORTEM
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Supplemental Documents InDeX
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