NRO-MOL_2015
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86 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the <strong>NRO</strong>’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents<br />
the Corporation’s Manned Systems Division. Gen<br />
Schriever objected to this arrangement, since it would<br />
place the Technical Director at the fourth organization<br />
level. He also noted that Aerospace had not adequately<br />
defined the Director’s responsibilities. Emphasizing<br />
the need for “vertical organization to totally support the<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> program,’’ Schriever said that all elements of the<br />
various corporate divisions “must be responsive to the<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> Director commensurate with the unique Air Force<br />
management structure.” 27<br />
He asked General Berg to work with Aerospace to<br />
provide a more acceptable organizational structure.<br />
Subsequently the corporation took steps to reorganize<br />
itself so that it paralleled the <strong>MOL</strong> Systems Office<br />
and was “in line with the overall <strong>MOL</strong> management<br />
concept.” On 14 October it established a <strong>MOL</strong> Systems<br />
Engineering Office headed by Dr. Leonard, Aerospace<br />
vice president, who would report directly to Dr. Donovan,<br />
senior technical vice president of the corporation. 28<br />
The Contractor Team<br />
On 25 August 1965, the President in his announcement<br />
named the two successful <strong>MOL</strong> contractors—Douglas<br />
Aircraft and General Electric—contrary to the original<br />
DDR&E plan, which had called for selecting one<br />
contractor for Phase I definition. This decision to go<br />
ahead with two industrial concerns had origins in Air<br />
Force-DDR&E discussions which followed the award of<br />
the 60-day laboratory vehicle study contracts on 1 March<br />
to Boeing, Douglas, General Electric, and Lockheed.<br />
Thus, on 18 March General Evans reported to McMillan<br />
that he had found “there are arguments within the Air<br />
Force and certainly within DDR&E against proceeding<br />
with a single contractor.” These parties suggested<br />
that by continuing with more than one firm during the<br />
definition phase, a competitive atmosphere would be<br />
preserved “from which, hopefully, will emerge better<br />
cost and schedule information and perhaps new ideas.”<br />
General Evans was opposed to this suggestion. He said<br />
that “we cannot afford the luxury of another competitive<br />
study period” and expressed the view that there were<br />
more advantages to proceeding with a single contractor.<br />
It would be cheaper, he said, the security problem would<br />
be less with one contractor and the administration of a<br />
single contract would be easier. 29<br />
By late May and early June 1965, after the <strong>MOL</strong> Source<br />
Selection Board had submitted its evaluations of the four<br />
contractor proposals, a new rationale was offered for<br />
proceeding with two of the firms which gained general<br />
approval. That is, it was argued that the program could be<br />
strengthened by integrating the two strongest contractors<br />
into a single team. On 12 June General Schriever<br />
formally proposed to General McConnell, the Chief of<br />
Staff, that they adopt the two-contractor approach. He<br />
explained that while “contractor A clearly offers the best<br />
overall technical program and management approach,<br />
the proposal of contractor D is superior in a few important<br />
respects that bear on mission capability. This suggests it<br />
may be particularly advantageous to the government to<br />
include contractor D in the program in those areas where<br />
his capabilities will strengthen the development team.” 30<br />
The Chief of Staff thought this proposal worth pursuing,<br />
whereupon a study was undertaken to identify “the<br />
allocation of specific tasks” in the program between<br />
the two contractors. It was quickly found that the tasks<br />
to be done divided readily into three major categories<br />
involving the laboratory vehicle, the sensor module, and<br />
the payload of sensor package itself. In a memorandum<br />
to General McConnell on 25 July, the AFSC Commander<br />
described these as follows:<br />
1. The laboratory vehicle contractor would be<br />
the system integration contractor, responsible for<br />
structural analysis of the entire system through<br />
the launch phase and the successful operation<br />
through the 30-day mission of all elements except<br />
those actually contained in the sensor module.<br />
2. The sensor module contractor would be<br />
responsible for receiving requirements from the<br />
sensor designer and Systems Program Office,<br />
and would “define, assign, and engineer a<br />
discrete structural carrier for the sensor package<br />
and associated crew displays.” He also would<br />
assemble and test the sensor module elements<br />
and prepare them for launch, and provide interface<br />
requirements to the laboratory vehicle contractor<br />
for his own equipment as well as those from the<br />
sensor contractor.<br />
3. The sensor contractor would be responsible<br />
for the design, fabrication and test of the sensor<br />
elements and package. The sensor contractor<br />
would interface principally with the sensor module<br />
contractor. 31<br />
The two-contractor approach was discussed further<br />
on 30 June by Secretary Zuckert, Dr. Flax, and other<br />
USAF officials. On 1 July additional information was<br />
sent to the Chief of Staff and gained his endorsement.<br />
Subsequently, in the management plan sent to OSD<br />
on 24 August, Secretary Zuckert reviewed the Source<br />
Selection Board results and reported that it had rated<br />
the four competing firms in the following order of merit: