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86 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the <strong>NRO</strong>’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents<br />

the Corporation’s Manned Systems Division. Gen<br />

Schriever objected to this arrangement, since it would<br />

place the Technical Director at the fourth organization<br />

level. He also noted that Aerospace had not adequately<br />

defined the Director’s responsibilities. Emphasizing<br />

the need for “vertical organization to totally support the<br />

<strong>MOL</strong> program,’’ Schriever said that all elements of the<br />

various corporate divisions “must be responsive to the<br />

<strong>MOL</strong> Director commensurate with the unique Air Force<br />

management structure.” 27<br />

He asked General Berg to work with Aerospace to<br />

provide a more acceptable organizational structure.<br />

Subsequently the corporation took steps to reorganize<br />

itself so that it paralleled the <strong>MOL</strong> Systems Office<br />

and was “in line with the overall <strong>MOL</strong> management<br />

concept.” On 14 October it established a <strong>MOL</strong> Systems<br />

Engineering Office headed by Dr. Leonard, Aerospace<br />

vice president, who would report directly to Dr. Donovan,<br />

senior technical vice president of the corporation. 28<br />

The Contractor Team<br />

On 25 August 1965, the President in his announcement<br />

named the two successful <strong>MOL</strong> contractors—Douglas<br />

Aircraft and General Electric—contrary to the original<br />

DDR&E plan, which had called for selecting one<br />

contractor for Phase I definition. This decision to go<br />

ahead with two industrial concerns had origins in Air<br />

Force-DDR&E discussions which followed the award of<br />

the 60-day laboratory vehicle study contracts on 1 March<br />

to Boeing, Douglas, General Electric, and Lockheed.<br />

Thus, on 18 March General Evans reported to McMillan<br />

that he had found “there are arguments within the Air<br />

Force and certainly within DDR&E against proceeding<br />

with a single contractor.” These parties suggested<br />

that by continuing with more than one firm during the<br />

definition phase, a competitive atmosphere would be<br />

preserved “from which, hopefully, will emerge better<br />

cost and schedule information and perhaps new ideas.”<br />

General Evans was opposed to this suggestion. He said<br />

that “we cannot afford the luxury of another competitive<br />

study period” and expressed the view that there were<br />

more advantages to proceeding with a single contractor.<br />

It would be cheaper, he said, the security problem would<br />

be less with one contractor and the administration of a<br />

single contract would be easier. 29<br />

By late May and early June 1965, after the <strong>MOL</strong> Source<br />

Selection Board had submitted its evaluations of the four<br />

contractor proposals, a new rationale was offered for<br />

proceeding with two of the firms which gained general<br />

approval. That is, it was argued that the program could be<br />

strengthened by integrating the two strongest contractors<br />

into a single team. On 12 June General Schriever<br />

formally proposed to General McConnell, the Chief of<br />

Staff, that they adopt the two-contractor approach. He<br />

explained that while “contractor A clearly offers the best<br />

overall technical program and management approach,<br />

the proposal of contractor D is superior in a few important<br />

respects that bear on mission capability. This suggests it<br />

may be particularly advantageous to the government to<br />

include contractor D in the program in those areas where<br />

his capabilities will strengthen the development team.” 30<br />

The Chief of Staff thought this proposal worth pursuing,<br />

whereupon a study was undertaken to identify “the<br />

allocation of specific tasks” in the program between<br />

the two contractors. It was quickly found that the tasks<br />

to be done divided readily into three major categories<br />

involving the laboratory vehicle, the sensor module, and<br />

the payload of sensor package itself. In a memorandum<br />

to General McConnell on 25 July, the AFSC Commander<br />

described these as follows:<br />

1. The laboratory vehicle contractor would be<br />

the system integration contractor, responsible for<br />

structural analysis of the entire system through<br />

the launch phase and the successful operation<br />

through the 30-day mission of all elements except<br />

those actually contained in the sensor module.<br />

2. The sensor module contractor would be<br />

responsible for receiving requirements from the<br />

sensor designer and Systems Program Office,<br />

and would “define, assign, and engineer a<br />

discrete structural carrier for the sensor package<br />

and associated crew displays.” He also would<br />

assemble and test the sensor module elements<br />

and prepare them for launch, and provide interface<br />

requirements to the laboratory vehicle contractor<br />

for his own equipment as well as those from the<br />

sensor contractor.<br />

3. The sensor contractor would be responsible<br />

for the design, fabrication and test of the sensor<br />

elements and package. The sensor contractor<br />

would interface principally with the sensor module<br />

contractor. 31<br />

The two-contractor approach was discussed further<br />

on 30 June by Secretary Zuckert, Dr. Flax, and other<br />

USAF officials. On 1 July additional information was<br />

sent to the Chief of Staff and gained his endorsement.<br />

Subsequently, in the management plan sent to OSD<br />

on 24 August, Secretary Zuckert reviewed the Source<br />

Selection Board results and reported that it had rated<br />

the four competing firms in the following order of merit:

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