NRO-MOL_2015
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Chapter XI - BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS—1965 - 1966<br />
107<br />
BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND SCHEDULE<br />
PROBLEMS—1965-1966<br />
Even as Air Force officials were reacting to PSAC’s<br />
insistence that they incorporate an unmanned<br />
configuration into the <strong>MOL</strong> program*, a severe financial<br />
problem arose that threatened and finally delayed early<br />
system acquisition. Some 60 days after the President<br />
authorized the Air Force to go ahead with the program,<br />
Daniel J. Fink, Deputy Director (Strategic and Space<br />
Systems), ODDR&E, asked the <strong>MOL</strong> Program Office to<br />
review and substantiate its fiscal 1967 and 1968 budget<br />
requirements for Phase II engineering development. This<br />
review was the beginning of a critical OSD evaluation of<br />
the Air Force’s budget requests. Apparently anticipating<br />
an OSD rejection, Dr. Flax in early November 1965 cut<br />
$20 million from the Air Force 1967 <strong>MOL</strong> request, bringing<br />
the total down from $395 million to about $374 million.<br />
Schriever later remarked to Evans that, while he could<br />
not quarrel with the Assistant Secretary’s cut, “because<br />
it is arbitrary,” he disagreed with the procedure. 1<br />
The <strong>MOL</strong> Program Director, however, soon had much<br />
more to worry about than a $20 million reduction.<br />
From the Secretary of Defense’s office came word<br />
that McNamara intended to limit the <strong>MOL</strong> program in<br />
1967 to $150 million—the same sum provided in 1966.<br />
Secretary Brown immediately wrote to the defense<br />
chief to voice concern. He pointed out that the original<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> plan had projected the first manned flight in late<br />
calendar year 1968, based on a schedule requiring<br />
the start of engineering development in January 1966.<br />
Dr. Brown reviewed several alternate schedules which<br />
might be adopted to reduce fiscal year 1967 funding<br />
requirements. But these, he advised Mr. McNamara,<br />
would have the effect of slipping the first manned flight<br />
three to 12 months. He said a development schedule<br />
with a goal of a first manned launch in April 1969 would<br />
require about $294 million during the year. He further<br />
stated that a $230 million budget would be “the lowest<br />
fiscal year 1967 funding compatible with maintaining<br />
continuity of contractor efforts already under way” and<br />
an early manned flight. 2<br />
On 18 November, analyzing the <strong>MOL</strong> funding problem<br />
for DDR&E, Deputy Director Fink expressed agreement<br />
with the above arguments. That is, he said that if $294<br />
million were provided, the first manned <strong>MOL</strong> could be<br />
flown in early calendar year 1969. If an additional slip of<br />
three to six months was considered acceptable, funding<br />
could be reduced to approximately $230 million. Fink<br />
* See pp 164 ff.<br />
recommended to Dr. Foster that the <strong>MOL</strong> budget not be<br />
reduced below the $230 million level. (Endnote 3) These<br />
arguments failed to convince McNamara, who, in the final<br />
thrashing out of the fiscal year 1967 DoD budget request,<br />
concluded that $150 million was sufficient for <strong>MOL</strong> † .<br />
This severe cut in 1967 spending plans was a main topic<br />
of discussion between Brown, McConnell, Schriever,<br />
Paul, Flax, Marks, and Ferguson on 30 November 1965<br />
at a meeting of the <strong>MOL</strong> Policy Committee. Dr. Brown<br />
reported that Foster and Flax were working on alternate<br />
plans to slip the program either six or nine months, with<br />
fiscal year 1967 funding needs to be calculated in each<br />
case. Flax said that DDR&E was in agreement that $150<br />
million would not be enough to support the program<br />
during the year. However, Assistant Secretary Marks<br />
advised the Committee that there was little hope for<br />
reinstatement of the bulk of the requested <strong>MOL</strong> funds. 4<br />
Marks’ view was soon borne out as OSD rejected an Air<br />
Force reclaim and the $150 million total was incorporated<br />
into the President’s defense budget for submission<br />
to Congress in January 1966. On 9 December Evans<br />
informed Berg of <strong>MOL</strong>’s unhappy financial prospects.<br />
He said there was a possibility that the final budget<br />
might provide a slightly higher level but, in any event,<br />
the Systems Office should ‘’cost out alternative <strong>MOL</strong><br />
programs” based on various funding levels, which in<br />
each case would insure a balanced program. 5<br />
Subsequently, on 29 December 1965, General Berg<br />
reported to the <strong>MOL</strong> Program Office on possible actions<br />
that might be taken to minimize <strong>MOL</strong> expenditures in<br />
fiscal year 1967. His plan called for completing Phase IB<br />
studies by 1 May 1966 and initiating Phase II engineering<br />
development by 1 September. This could be done, he<br />
said, within a total 1967 budget of $237 million “plus the<br />
$100 million carryover of fiscal year 1966 funds.” He<br />
indicated, if only $150 million were provided, there would<br />
be a further stretch-out of the program. 6<br />
† The fiscal year 1967 budget, prepared in late calendar year 1965, was<br />
the first to feel the impact of the accelerating war in Southeast Asia. In the<br />
years that followed, the Vietnam War came to require enormous sums to the<br />
detriment of many defense projects including <strong>MOL</strong>.