NRO-MOL_2015

144 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
accept “a fund-governed program” tailored to $228
million in fiscal year 1967, $430 million in fiscal year
1968, “and whatever the approved DoD figure is in FY
1969.” Evans suggested MOL officials might consider a
possible fourth option: “...decoupling the optics from the
first manned flight with [the] objective being to provide a
more completely man- rated system when the first- flightqualified
DORIAN package becomes available.” 4
He also recommended the MOL Program Office
attempt to resolve several other issues, including
determining the best approach to funding future
contracts (commitment versus an expenditure basis),
obtaining a DX priority for the program , and reforming
MOL management. This last subject was a sensitive
one to Evans. For many months he had believed that
existing arrangements—which had black MOL contract,
development, management, and financial actions being
accomplished by another Air Force activity—were
ineffective. “The present management structure,” he
said, “is incapable of producing a well-integrated, wellmanaged
large program such as MOL.”** 5
Some of the questions posed by Evans were discussed
on 10 March 1967 during a management meeting attended
by Dr. Flax, General Ferguson, and other MOL officials
at Andrews AFB. Systems Office personnel briefed them
on proposed funding and schedule revisions which they
had been examining with the contractors. They advised
that, even if a 12-month schedule slip was acceptable,
MOL would require additional funds beyond the $500/600
million “Bogeys” proposed by Dr. Flax. If given only $480
million in fiscal year 1968, they foresaw a slip in the first
manned flight of at least 15 months. This discouraging
report was subsequently reviewed by Drs. Foster and
Brown, who asked that new guidance be sent to the MOL
Systems Office. Future funding, the Office was informed
on 17 March, was to be on “a commitment basis” and, for
planning purposes, totals were not to exceed $480 and
$620 million in fiscal years 1968 and 1969. The Systems
Office was directed to prepare a paper on the impact of
those funding levels for presentation to Pentagon officials
in Washington in April. 6
The MOL schedule was reworked by MOL Systems
Office personnel. They concluded that the 15-month
slip in the first manned launch constituted “an optimum
program from the standpoint of fund limitations” and
For many months Evans had sought to obtain approval for assignment of a
DX industrial priority to the program. The request was never acted upon.
** Gen Martin, previously opposed to Schriever’s plan for integrated
management, on 20 April 1967 agreed that “division of management
responsibility and authority on the basis of security is totally unworkable.” A
major management reorganization followed, which placed all black contracting
under the MOL Systems Office, effective 1 July 1967. [Ltr, Martin to Flax,
Ferguson, 20 Apr 67, subj: Management Responsibilities for the MOL Program]
would ease development and hardware integration
problems. However, even if funding was provided on a
commitment rather than an expenditure basis, they saw
the program requiring $518 million in fiscal year 1968.
On 15 April 1967 their conclusions were presented to a
MOL management meeting attended by Flax, Ferguson,
Stewart, Bleymaier †† , Martin, Berg, and others. Dr. Flax’s
response was to challenge the cost estimates presented
to him; it was his view that the contractor’s costs were
probably inflated, “at least for the scope of work as
currently defined.” He warned that the projected overall
total MOL program cost rise of about half a billion dollars,
if correct, might be “very detrimental” to its future and he
directed the MOL Systems Office to take another look at
its cost estimates. 7
The cost figures were subsequently reworked on the
West Coast and forwarded to Flax and Ferguson on 2
May by General Bleymaier and Colonel Heran. In their
message, they stated flatly that the funding levels of
$480/600 million in fiscal years 1968 and 1969 “positively
eliminate any possibility of establishing a realistic
12 month slip program.” Furthermore, those levels
placed in jeopardy their ability to meet a 15-month slip,
particularly if there were additional delays in contract
negotiations over the new schedule and deciding on
deferred items. They said that they had examined all
possibilities and nothing could be further gained by
efforts to hold the program to a 12-month slip. “The
only hope in holding the slip to 15 months,” they said,
“lies in proceeding immediately with the negotiations
of a 15 month schedule slide.’’ The contractors “firm
cost proposals,” based on their detailed analysis of a
15-month slip, indicated a two-year funding need for
$524 and $617 million. Accordingly, the $480 million
fiscal year 1968 funding limitation would produce a $44
million deficit, Bleymaier and Heran further stated that:
If you entertain the possibility of
placing increased emphasis on those
system elements that are critical
technically and schedule wise, you will
effectively reduce fund availability
to continue the orderly development
of the total system. To date, we
have proceeded on a balanced funding
approach with orderly development of
interfaces and testing. To deviate
would seriously impair the systems
approach. Expediting part of the
†† Bleymaier who officially took over as Deputy Director, MOL Program, on 1
July 1967, participated in various planning exercises during the spring of 1967.
He was, at this time, serving as Commander, Air Force Western Test Range,
Vandenberg AFB, Calif.