NRO-MOL_2015

28 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
NASA made a “counter-proposal.” It asked the Defense
Department to consider a program which would not extend
“quite so far as the establishment of a space station,
at least as its first objective.” On 30 November, after
representatives of both agencies discussed the subject
further, Dr. Brown submitted to Secretary McNamara
an additional memorandum which described the NASA
counter-proposal. He said it appeared likely that the
NASA staff would advise Webb “to agree, in principle, to
a manned military space program” which was separate
from but coordinated with, the NASA activity. However,
they would not agree to assigning DoD “the responsibility
for a space station” since they remained uncertain of
their own needs for such a vehicle. Consequently, they
suggested DoD fulfill its needs with an orbiting military
laboratory “which does not involve the complications of
personnel ferry, docking, and resupply.” 12
NASA’s proposal, it should be noted, was quite similar to
the Air Force’s 1962 plan for MODS. Like the USAF plan,
it also would use the Titan III to launch a Gemini capsule
and a cylindrical test module capable of supporting a
crew of from two to four men for 30 days. The Gemini
spacecraft would weigh 7,000 pounds and the module,
15,000 pounds. Cost of the system was estimated at
$593.0 million.
After comparing NASA’s counter-proposal with his
Alternative 3, Dr. Brown agreed that the space agency’s
plan was “an entirely reasonable and orderly development
approach which might well be followed whether or not the
final objective is the establishment of a space station.”
However, he thought that while much valuable military
testing could be accomplished using NASA’s approach,
it was not fully equivalent to a space station because it
lacked “the operations of rendezvous, docking, resupply
and crew rotation.” If Secretary McNamara accepted
NASA’s counter-proposal, it would have the effect of
delaying a Presidential decision on which organization
would have management responsibility for a space
station, “since their proposal would not be defined as a
station. § ” Dr. Brown said that while NASA’s alternative
was acceptable for “a near-term manned military space
station,” he felt it inferior to his own recommendation,
which he now reconfirmed. 13
After reviewing DDR&E’s memorandum, the same
day—30 November—McNamara met with Webb and
the two agency chiefs reached an oral agreement that
DoD would proceed to build a military space station. As
for the approach, McNamara decided to accept NASA’s
§ NASA did not want DoD to even use the term “space station.” An alternate
name, suggested by Dr. Yarymovych, was “manned orbiting laboratory.” As
was noted earlier, the Air Force in a planning document published in 1959 had
referred to a “manned orbital laboratory” as one of its requirements.
alternate proposal rather than the more complicated and
expensive system development described in DDR&E’s
Alternative 3.
The Air Force’s Last Effort to Save
Dyna-Soar
The Air Staff had been waiting, somewhat nervously,
for OSD’s decisions on the Dyna-Soar/Gemini review,
but received no official word until 12 November when
Dr. Brown informally advised Dr. Flax of the impending
decision. However, it was not until 2 December that the
Air Force received copies of Dr. Brown’s two lengthy
memoranda to McNamara (of 14 and 30 November)
with a request for comments. To help Dr. Flax prepare a
detailed response to the Brown memoranda, a technical
team from the Space Systems Division, headed by Brig
Gens Joseph Bleymaier and Joseph J. Cody, was flown
to Washington. Meanwhile, within Headquarters USAF
there ensued a last-minute effort to save the X-20. The
Air Staff prepared a 14-page paper which proposed
three alternate approaches for development of a space
station using the X-20 as a small two-man station or as a
ferry vehicle. On 4 December the Assistant Vice Chief of
Staff, Maj Gen John K. Hester, forwarded it to Secretary
Zuckert. He said:
I completely support the objective
as specified in these documents (the
14 and 30 November memoranda) of
achieving a manned military space
capability in the most practical and
least expensive manner. However, I
cannot agree with the conclusion
that the Gemini route coupled with
cancellation of the X-20 program and
initiation of a low L/D maneuvering
re-entry system will achieve this
objective, nor do I agree that the
approach will lead to a militarily
meaningful space program, either
operationally or from an economic
or timely point of view. Instead,
I believe that a reoriented X-20
program offers a highly promising
way to achieve a low cost, effective
manned military capability at an
early date. 14
General Hester recommended that the X-20 be
considered for use in the proposed military manned space
station. The same day he submitted these views, the Air
Force Secretary—after discussing the issue with Deputy