NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XIII - AIR FORCE/NASA COORDINATION
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the Titan IIIM/MOL systems into the post-Apollo manned
space flight program is neither technically desirable nor
cost effective, and it could jeopardize the possible U.S.
position in space by delaying by almost three years the
low orbital application of proven U.S. space technology.”
NASA forwarded a copy of the report, dated 2 November
1966, to OSD with a draft of a joint NASA/DoD
memorandum endorsing its conclusions. Before taking
any action on this memorandum, Dr. Foster requested
General Evans to critique the report.
On 6 December, after his staff had completed an intensive
evaluation of the NASA document, Evans reported the
MOL Program Office’s findings to DDR&E. They were
such “as to cast substantial doubt as to the objectivity,
analytical thoroughness, and technical accuracy of the
NASA report.” Evans said that the report contained
“undue bias against use of any hardware configuration
other than Saturn-Apollo.” Also, it took the position that
the NASA study was “a sequel to and the converse of”
the 1965 study on the possible use of Apollo systems
for both NASA and DoD experiments, implying “a jointly
planned and conducted study by DoD and NASA,” which
was false. The report further stated that the earlier study
had indicated that Saturn/ Apollo systems could be used,
beginning in 1968, to accomplish the DoD objectives
assigned to MOL. Concerning this, Evans remarked that:
There is no doubt that technically,
if given sufficient resources and
time, Apollo systems could be used
in MOL. Similarly, under the same
assumption, MOL systems could also be
used in AAP. However, the assessment
of the desirability of use of one
specific system hardware in another
program must consider all cost
effectiveness factors, principally
those associated with performance,
schedule, and cost. The comment on
last year’s study is incomplete and
is neither meaningful nor relevant. 50
The Vice Director, MOL, consequently recommended
that OSD “non-concur” in the 2 November 1966 NASA
report.
discuss the matter during the next meeting of the
Manned Space Flight Policy Committee. Dr. Seamans
accepted this suggestion. 51
NASA’s worries about the Bureau of the Budget
inquiry—and DoD’s position—were further exacerbated
by the attitude taken by the President’s Science Advisory
Committee. In December 1966 PSAC circulated a draft
report on “The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period”
which declared that:
Before substantial funds are
committed to the AAP plan to modify
Apollo hardware or to utilize the
orbital workshops for extended
periods, a careful study should be
made of the suitability, cost and
availability of Titan III/MOL systems
for biomedical studies of man for
periods up to 60 days. NASA should
also investigate whether delivery of
these components could be speeded
without interference with the MOL
program if additional funds were
contributed to MOL in the formative
years of the program
...Arrangements should be developed
between NASA and the USAF to use the
MOL Program as an importance source
of data on the capabilities of man
for space missions lasting 14 to 30
days, in addition to experience to be
gained in early Apollo Applications
missions. 52
Secretary McNamara thought the PSAC report
(published by the White House in February 1967), a very
fine job “which perceptively addresses the important
issues affecting NASA’s future programs.” It led in early
1967 to a Defense Department proposal that a joint DoD/
NASA study group to be set up to look into the entire
matter, beginning with “an examination of the objectives
of both Apollo Applications and follow-on MOL in low
earth orbit.” 53
Dr. Foster agreed. On 10 December he advised Dr.
Seamans that he had reservations about the report in
its “present form. Specifically, he said, the report did not
represent “a joint” study, but rather was a NASA study
on data provided by DoD on Titan III/MOL hardware. He
also indicated there were other unsatisfactory aspects
to the NASA report and he said he was prepared to