NRO-MOL_2015

100 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
target systems. The Air Force also was to assess
the manned and unmanned systems’ ability to
circumvent weather phenomena. 22
On 8 April Flax instructed Martin to “let us quickly as
possible” two conceptual system study contracts for an
unmanned reconnaissance satellite system employing
the DORIAN optical subsystem. The unmanned system
was to have a lifetime goal of at least 30 days on orbit
and make use of existing and projected technology,
components, and subsystems to the maximum extent
possible. The minimum product desired from each
contractor, he said, was “a conceptual system design
with appropriate analyses,” which identified and analyzed
critical technology, components and/or subsystems. The
contractors also were to provide an estimated system
schedule and detailed costs of a follow on operational
program at a rate of about 5-6 launches per year. 23
Flax also requested the Directorate of Special Projects
to undertake a separate in-house conceptual study of
a wholly unmanned system, to be submitted with the
results of the contractor studies by 6 June 1966. The
three studies—except for technical information inputs—
were to be managed “apart from the MOL Program Office
and of your DORIAN project office.” Five days later the
Directorate of Special Projects awarded two 60-day study
contracts ($220,000 each) to Lockheed and General
Electric to develop a conceptual system design and
schedules and costs for a wholly unmanned system. 24
These investigations were well under way when General
Schriever—two days after being briefed on 25 April on
the preliminary conclusions of the Man in the MOL study
group—directed Gen Berg to initiate three new studies
with results to be made available to him about the same
time the wholly unmanned system investigations were
completed. He asked, first of all, for a cost comparison
study of an optimized manned and unmanned system
to include a projection of probability of mission success
of each version. Secondly, he requested that another
investigation be undertaken similar to the above which
concentrated on “an advanced DORIAN system capable
of {better than one foot} ground resolution, comparing
again optimum manned and optimum unmanned
configurations.” His third requirement was for a “broadly
based parametric study of all relevant factors of
experience in past space flight manned and unmanned.”
Schriever emphasized the importance of these studies
“in the support and justification of the MOL program.” In
the final analysis, he considered that all of the studies
should contribute “and must be woven into a logical
rationale” and theme which clearly showed “a current,
defensible contribution of man to the current MOL system,
and an expanding capability for follow-on systems which
can be exploited in an effective manner.” 25
While work on these new studies began, the MOL
Policy Committee on 29 April reviewed the situation.
Concerning the wholly unmanned DORIAN system
investigations resulting from Mr. Schultze’s request,
Dr. Brown commented that the Budget Bureau had
not received much sympathy “from either DoD or Dr.
Hornig.” He reported that he and Dr. Flax had discussed
Schultze’s request with Secretary McNamara and had
reviewed the cost effectiveness of MOL as compared
to GAMBIT 3. He commented that while an unmanned
photographic system to operate for 30 days might be
feasible, it also would be costly. Dr. Flax remarked that
as the unmanned system studies progressed, it was
becoming more evident that “man is a neatly packaged
system to do many tasks.” 26 When Schriever commented
that the desired capability could be attained sooner
with the manned approach, Dr. Brown reiterated that
neither McNamara nor Hornig were against the manned
system. The Secretary of Defense, he said, wanted
the intelligence data and only questioned the best way
to get it. However, Brown added that cost increases
or schedule slips could change the current OSD bias
favoring the manned MOL. 27
Because of a delay in completing the various studies,
it was not until mid-June 1966 that the results of the
two contracted investigations and the in-house Special
Projects analysis were available. In Washington, the
NRO staff also had performed an in-house study of
the manned and unmanned versions of MOL from the
standpoint of the total number of intelligence targets
which might be photographed during a typical 30-day
mission. In forwarding a copy of the NRO study to OSD,
General Evans noted that:
The results of the study show that,
with the astronauts performing a
weather avoidance role, the manned
system will successfully photograph
significantly more intelligence
targets than will the unmanned
system on a comparable mission.
Various cases were examined and the
improved factor of the manned system
over the unmanned ranged from 15 to
45 percent. The general conclusion
reached by the study is that on
identical missions against average
Sino-Soviet weather, the manned
system with the astronaut providing