NRO-MOL_2015

60 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
Worries Over MOL Security
When NRO officials in Washington and Special
Projects personnel on the West Coast read Dr.
Brown’s 4 January memorandum, they were startled
by its reference to acquiring a MOL reconnaissance
capability. Twelve months before, in January 1964,
the Director of the NRO Staff had expressed concern
over the breakdown of security discipline resulting from
widespread MOL discussions at that time. Subsequently,
the NRO devised and established Project DORIAN as a
means of controlling all information relating to satellite
reconnaissance activities.
Now, in January 1965, General Martin * bluntly informed
Dr. McMillan that Brown’s memorandum constituted a
violation of NRO security. He said its implication, although
it did not explicitly use the word “reconnaissance,” was
obvious. “The overall impression created in the minds of
unwitting people involved,” he said, “has been that MOL
has finally been assigned a reconnaissance mission.”
He emphasized the need for prompt security decisions
before any further MOL correspondence was issued,
pointing to the following dangers if no action was taken:
The security of MOL reconnaissance
aspects is inescapably tied to the
security of the unmanned satellite
reconnaissance program. Exposure
of MOL reconnaissance capability
to anyone outside the BYEMAN
system automatically will provoke
pressure for disclosure of unmanned
reconnaissance data. Such personnel
will want to know how the MOL
capability compares with the
unmanned satellite reconnaissance
capability. 5
As a consequence of this situation, a working group
which included General Greer’s special assistant, Col
Ralph J. Ford, and Col Paul E. Worthman of the NRO
Staff, was formed to prepare recommendations on
the security aspects of the MOL program. The group
proposed a basic approach which would provide for
“an absolutely clear and separate division between
reconnaissance oriented tasks (DORIAN/BYEMAN)
and non-reconnaissance related tasks in MOL.” General
Greer endorsed this approach and on 30 January 1965
recommended to Dr. McMillan that all payload studies
and. development of passive-in-nature Sigint and
terrestrial (of the earth) image forming sensors, “having
* At this time General Martin, former Director of the NRO Staff, was
understudying General Greer, who was scheduled to retire on 1 July 1965.
practical intelligence collection application,” be controlled
by the Director of NRO under Project DORIAN and within
the BYEMAN security system. Studies and work not
involving reconnaissance payloads, i.e., such as those
concerned with general experiments to determine man’s
usefulness in space, would be subject to normal security
restrictions, such as those contained in DoD Directive
520012 and AFR 205-3. 6
Dr. McMillan approved these recommendations and, on
5 February, he issued a paper titled “Special Security
Procedures for the Department of Defense Manned
Orbiting Laboratory,” a copy of which he sent to Dr. Brown.
He advised the Defense Research Director that it had
become clear from detailed analysis of work statements,
procedures and methodology, “that the only practical
recourse is to keep any reconnaissance, including active
sensor work, black.” He said he thought this could be
handled in a manner “which does not detract from the
efficiency of the current activities nor will it hamper the
DoD-NASA exchange of information...” 7
Seven weeks later McMillan also issued additional
guidance and security policies to govern MOL study and
developmental activity. He emphasized that all payload
study and other work would have to be cleared by him to
insure appropriate security controls. 8
A Revised MOL Management
Structure
Dr. Brown’s redirection of the program on 4 January was
followed by important changes in the MOL management
structure. As noted earlier, General Schriever during 1964
had urged that a strong central management office be set
up in the Washington area. McMillan, however, decided
that an Air Staff coordination office, which in mid-1964
was organized as the Office of the Assistant for MOL † ,
would be sufficient for the time being. General Schriever
objected to this arrangement as inadequate. He said
the new office simply could not provide the leadership,
channels, and direction needed for the program. On 18
August 1964, he once more strongly urged the Air Force
Under Secretary to establish “a single integrated office.” 9
In response to General Schriever’s criticism, Dr.
McMillan on 3 September met with Colonel Schultz, the
Assistant for MOL, and Mr. Frank Ross, of the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, to
discuss the management question. Afterwards, he asked
them to prepare working papers on MOL management
† Redesignated on 9 November 1964 as the Assistant for Manned Flight,
to take into account its other responsibilities including the NASA Gemini
experiments project and certain coordination activities involving the space
agency.