NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter X - THE MANNED/UNMANNED SYSTEM STUDIES 1965 - 1966
95
In his opening remarks to the group, Dr. Land emphasized
that both the manned and unmanned system could
make use of a considerable amount of interchangeable
components, “provided that the original design was carried
out, from the beginning, on this basis.” The Panel’s view
was made clear by Dr. Shea, who was Deputy Director
for NASA Manned Space Flight. He cited the space
agency’s experience with Project Apollo, which included
a good example and a bad one of how to approach the
manned/unmanned capability problem. He said the good
example had involved the Lunar Excursion Module (FEM)
development. From its earliest inception, agency officials
levied a requirement on the designers to fly the same basic
equipment in unmanned as well as manned modes. With
everyone accepting this requirement from the beginning,
the solution proved relatively simple. On the other hand,
the example of how not to do the job occurred in the
Command Service Module (CSM) Project. The planners
“barreled along” for a while, designing everything for the
manned-only mode of operation. Later, when they tried to
convert to add the unmanned capability, the result proved
very complex. These remarks of Dr. Shea’s were clearly
endorsed by the panel. 7
Following the PSAC meeting, General Martin
informed Dr. Flax that the current Phase I MOL project
definition effort was oriented “entirely on a manned-only
minimally automated design” and that consideration
of an unmanned capability had been limited to study
tasks based on converting the manned-only design to
unmanned operations. No efforts to date, he reported
were based on the single design with dual operating
modes, as urged by the PSAC panel. Quite the contrary
“all our efforts so far have been in the direction which
they clearly don’t want.” 8
The PSAC panel views on the MOL were restated
formally by Dr. Hornig on 22 November in a memorandum
to Dr. Flax. The panel believed that a {better than 1 foot}
resolution could be obtained by a properly designed
unmanned as well as manned system. It thought that
MOL officials should pursue an operational program
which could use both elements of the system.” It
interpreted the Hornig-Brown agreement of 23 August
to mean the initial system definition would produce a
design consistent with the above guidance and that the
separate modules and conversion equipment necessary
for automatic operation would be developed and built
“concurrently with the manned MOL.” 9
As a consequence of this· PSAC guidance, MOL
Program officials initiated studies of the system design
to determine which manned functions would have
to be automated and how to do it. On 30 November
Colonel Allen reported to a meeting of the MOL Policy
Committee that analyses and investigations were under
way which addressed the points raised by the panel.
He said he believed these studies would be sufficiently
comprehensive to· enable decisions to be made by
mid-December on the basic MOL configuration. At this
meeting General Schriever, who wished to emphasize the
manned system, reported he had talked with Astronauts
L. Gordon Cooper and Charles Conrad, Jr. § , and that
both were skeptical of a design approach for a manned
vehicle which stressed the use of automatic modes. 10
The unmanned/manned studies and investigations—
conducted by West Coast agencies and the contractors—
were completed on schedule by mid-December. They
indicated that automatic alignment, tracking, focus
adjustment, and image motion compensation for the
sensor were feasible and that, as Eastman Kodak
expressed it, “full automation of the system was not a
major problem.” The investigators concluded that the
unmanned mode resolution would approach that of
the manned version; however, the latter would offer
important advantages in targeting, readout, and visual
reconnaissance. They also agreed that the manned/
unmanned configuration should be established “as
baseline” but noted that incorporation of automatic
features into the manned vehicle would create a weight
problem, and create other difficulties. 11
The MOL Systems Office moved at once to revise
its general performance and design requirements
specification to incorporate the dual approach. On 23
December General Berg formally notified the MOL
contractors of the change. He directed them to include,
within the basic MOL design, “such automaticity and
redundancy that with removal of the Gemini and selected
laboratory components, and the addition of appropriate
kits to the laboratory, the system can be flown unmanned.”
He also informed them that the contract definition phase
was extended to 1 May 1966; the system acquisition
phase would begin 1 September 1966; and the first
manned flight would take place in September 1969. 12
However, concerning this schedule, Eastman Kodak
advised that the first set of optics would not be available
before late 1969 and a January 1970 flight date was the
earliest that optics availability could support . 13
Meanwhile, the MOL Program Office arranged to brief
the Reconnaissance Panel on the steps taken by the
Air Force to automate the MOL mission module. At
an informal meeting on 7 January 1966, Dr. Flax and
Colonel Allen reported to Drs. Hornig, Land, Purcell,
§ Cooper and Conrad, pilots of Gemini 5, completed 120 revolutions of the
earth during their eight days in space, 21-29 August 1965.
This was but the first of a number of program slippages attributable to
difficulties associated with development of the unique optics package.