NRO-MOL_2015

62 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
Within Headquarters USAF, however, some questions
were raised over “the limited degree of Air Staff
participation” in the program. On 9 February 1965 the
Space Panel expressed the opinion that while the Chief of
Staff had concurred with the management organization,
“he did so as an initial means of providing necessary
response to OSD, and did not necessarily envision it as
a continuing method of program management.” 19
In any event, by early 1965 the MOL management
structure consisted of the MOL Policy Committee and
the Special Assistant in the Pentagon. Within AFSC
there was Schriever’s Assistant Deputy Commander for
Space for MOL and a system project office on the West
Coast. Finally, the Directorate of Special Projects on the
Coast also had major responsibilities in the “black” area.
As I see it, from the point of view
of the Department of Defense, the
central question relative to the
Manned Orbiting Laboratory is one of
existence: the question whether or
not to proceed with a major program
of manned military space flight. This
is a question to which the Secretary
of Defense must develop an answer.
Furthermore, before any such program
is undertaken... he must reach
agreement with the President’s
Science Advisor and the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget that the
program of military, engineering
and scientific experiments and
steps toward operational capability
is worth the cost and does not
duplicate approved programs in any
other agency. 20
McMillan said that if a decision was made to proceed
with the military project, many contingent decisions would
follow. Those that would directly affect NASA would
involve the manner in which MOL might support space
agency objectives and whether or not NASA hardware
and resources would be used. To clarify the issue of
“program duplication,” he said information was needed
on whether Apollo could be used for MOL. He referred to
a recent suggestion made by Adm W. F. Boone of NASA
that they form an ad hoc board within the Aeronautics
and Astronautics Coordination Board to consider the
results of DoD and NASA studies and arrive at findings.
McMillan agreed an ad hoc group would be helpful but he
opposed involving the AACB because of security. 21
Figure 36. MOL Drawing
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
NASA’s MOL/Apollo Study
Even as MOL management was being strengthened,
Drs. Brown and McMillan were initiating discussions with
NASA to obtain space agency contributions to the study
program. In a letter to Dr. Seamans in early January
in which he solicited NASA’s cooperation, McMillan
remarked:
Dr. Brown also wrote to Seamans about space agency
inputs. On 11 January he proposed that NASA submit a
briefing and supporting documents to DoD by 1 March
giving its best estimate of Apollo capabilities to serve
as a military facility for earth orbit operations. He also
solicited information on: (1) any Apollo improvements
which it was likely NASA would undertake as part of its
program; (2) the times at which Apollo equipment could
be procured and operated by the Air Force for orbital
operations without interfering with the national lunar
landing program; and (3) the cost history of Apollo and
the Saturn booster. In addition, he asked Dr. Seamans to
submit a description of NASA’s planned scientific earth
orbit experiments which MOL might be able to perform. 22
Recognizing the importance of the DoD study and the
implications it might have on the space agency’s program
(i.e., it would be a great coup should Saturn/Apollo be
selected for the MOL program), Dr. Seamans promised