NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XVI - POST-MORTEM
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Unfortunately, the Air Force was unable to come up with
another mission it could sell to OSD. As a result, during
the late 1960s, MOL got caught between the extremely
tight defense budget caused by the Vietnam war and the
CIA/BOB arguments that unmanned reconnaissance
vehicles could do the job cheaper.
The cancellation of MOL ended an Air Force dream
of space flight that began in 1945, when General Hap
Arnold spoke of the possibility of “true space ships,
capable of operating outside the earth’s atmosphere.”
After Sputnik, Air Force hopes and imagination soared,
but its initial plan of early 1958 to get a man into space
“soonest” was scuttled six months later with the creation
of NASA. It then put its space flight hopes into Dyna-
Soar, only to see that program terminated in December
1963 by Secretary McNamara.
Although the Defense Chief approved MOL as Dyna-
Saar’s successor, it took two years of paper studies
before the Air Force was given the green light in 1965.
Unfortunately, 1965 also was the year the United States
sent military forces into South Vietnam to prevent that
country’s takeover by the Communist North. The cost
of the Vietnamese war— which incredibly became the
longest war in America’s history—contributed directly
to MOL’s demise. MOL had the misfortune, as one
observer put it, “of reaching a peak of financial need for
full development and production at a time when the war
in Vietnam was draining off all available assets.”
During the summer of 1969—after hearing Dr. Seamans
lament before his Senate Appropriations Committee that
the decision to cancel MOL had been reached “over the
objections of the Air Force, including the Secretary”—
Senator Russell remarked: “I can understand the
decision to postpone, but I did not know we had totally
cancelled all military manned exploratory use of space.
Because of what man is now doing in space, the control,
knowledge, and utilization of space may well determine
the course of future wars.” Many airmen were convinced
that this was so.
Endnotes
1. Ltr, Susan Kasparian, Tustin, Calif., to the
Secretary of Defense, 12 June 69.
2. Memo (U), Ford to Seamans, 3 Dec 69, subj: MOL
Termination.
3. Heaings before House Subcmte on Appns, 9lst
Cong, lst Sess, Part 4, DoD Appns for 1970, pp 753-762.
4. Memo (S-DORIAN), Ferguson to Seamans/
McLucas, 23 Dec 69, subj: MOL Prcgram Close-Out Status.
5. Memo (U), Seamans to Grant L. Hansen, Asst
SAF (R&D), 30 Jun 69, Mins (U), Ad Hoc Gp for MOL
Residuals, Meeting of l Jul 69 and 10-11 Jul 69, prep by
Lt. Col. Donald L. Steeban, MOL Program Office.
6. Memo (TS-DORIAN), Hansen to Seamans, 1 Aug
69; no subj, w/atch Report, Review of MOL Residuals,
1 Aug 69.
7. Memo (U), Seamans to Laird, 6 Oct 69.
8. Memo (U), Hansen to Seamans, 23 Sep 69;
Seamans to Hansen, 29 Sep 69, no subj.
9. Memos (S-DORIAN), Ford to McLucas, 22 Sep
69; McLucas to Seamans, 24 Sep 69, Intvw, author with
Samuel H. Hubbard, Chief, MOL Plans and Tech Div,
28 Jun 1970.
10. Ltrs (TS-DORIAN), Seamans to Newell, 29 Sep
69; Newell to McLucas, 7 Nov 69; McLucas to Newell,
23 Dec 69.
11. Intvw, author with Hubbard, 28 Jan 70.
As the 1970s began, the Air Force had only the feeblest
hope that a new joint effort with NASA—to develop a
“reusable” space shuttle that could rendezvous with
orbiting vehicles and return to land on earth a la Dyna-
Soar—might provide it with the opportunity to get in the
necessary “stick time” in space that it had sought for
more than a decade.