NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XIV - NEW FINANCIAL AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS 1967-1968
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but to establish national intelligence requirements.
He said MOL’s value and scope had been reviewed in
detail and endorsed by McNamara, Schultze, Vance,
Brown and Hornig before the President announced his
1965 decision. Further, he had personally reviewed
the program and felt it would be valuable “to the future
reconnaissance requirement.” Foster suggested to
Bohlen that the Defense Department brief him in detail on
the program; the offer was accepted and a presentation
made several days later. 24
Figure 57. Richard M. Helms
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
Bohlen’s criticism was similar to that expressed by
Richard Helms, Director of the CIA. On 5 March 1968,
he forwarded to Dr. Foster a statement summarizing his
views, which he suggested be incorporated in a MOL
Development Concept Paper ODDR&E was preparing
with the assistance of Air Force officials §§ . This CIA
statement read:
Mr. Helms, Director of Central
Intelligence, has reservations as to
the value of better [than one foot}
resolution photography for national
intelligence purposes. He recognizes
that photography with resolutions
better than that obtainable by the
GAMBIT-3 system would be helpful but
does not believe studies conducted
§§ The Development Concept Paper was a management device established
by McNamara in September 1967. Its purpose was to “document the full
military and economic consequences and the risks involved in each new major
R&D program.”
to date shown that the value of this
increased resolution justified the
expenditures associated with the MOL
Program. He has initiated a review
of these studies. 25
The review by the CIA was completed by mid-May
1968, at which time Helms forwarded a summary of its
conclusions to Ambassador Bohlen, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Nitze, and the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget. It declared that there was no doubt very high
resolution MOL photography “would make a valuable
contribution to intelligence, particularly on detailed
information relating to Soviet and Chinese weapons and
programs.” Satellite photography with {the best possible}
to 12 inch resolution would help identify a larger number
of small items or features beyond existing capabilities.
It would increase U.S. confidence in identifying items
“we can now [only] discern” and would reduce the error
of measurement of such items. Higher resolutions also
would improve U.S. understanding of some operating
procedures and construction methods at Soviet military
installations and technical processes and the capacities
of certain industrial facilities. 26
But, despite all the above cited advantages, the CIA
paper concluded that no important agency estimates of
Soviet or Chinese military posture, weapon performance,
or size and composition of forces would be changed
significantly by MOL photography. This conclusion, it said,
was based partly on the judgment that some of the nation’s
outstanding intelligence problems were more likely to
be solved by the acquisition of technical information
from systems other than satellite photography. It noted,
for example, that “electronic intelligence is needed for
solving certain problems critical to our estimates of the
capabilities of surface-to-air ABM systems...” Programs
for the collection of such information were either under
way or were scheduled for operation “by the time the MOL
is operational.” In summary, the CIA report stated that,
while there was no question that satellite photography
with ground resolutions of {the best anticipated} to 12
inches would provide useful intelligence, the “pivotal
question” remained whether such additional intelligence
was worth the costs. 27