NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XIII - AIR FORCE/NASA COORDINATION
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AIR FORCE/NASA COORDINATION
By 1965-1966 Air Force and NASA manned space
programs had evolved to the point where the competition
between the two agencies had manifestly declined.
Deeply involved in its Gemini program, NASA at this time
was also laying the ground work for its multi-billion dollar
Apollo moon-landing project.* The Air Force, meanwhile,
was working energetically to get going with the MOL,
which it believed would provide the vehicle that would
conclusively demonstrate the value of putting a man into
space to perform various military missions, beginning
with reconnaissance. This period saw increasing
coordination of the efforts of both agencies. Thus, in 1965
the Evans/Garbarini group had worked closely together
on the Apollo/MOL studies, which provided comparative
cost figures and other data to the Air Force. Also, the
following year, as we have seen, NASA backed up the
Air Force during the noisy ETR-WTR controversy.
In addition to the above examples of cooperation, the
two agencies coordinated their activities in several other
areas. One involved the release and modification of
certain NASA flight equipment for use in an Air Force
pre-MOL flight test program. Another—which generated
differing views before a compromise was reached—
centered on the question of Air Force procurement of the
Gemini B spacecraft.
NASA’s Gemini and the Gemini B
Contract
Several months before John Glenn became the first
Mercury astronaut to orbit the earth in early 1962,
NASA formally announced the initiation of the Gemini
program. On 15 December 1961 it awarded a $25 million
contract to McDonnell to begin design, development,
and manufacture of 13 Gemini spacecraft. (The cost
of these vehicles eventually ballooned to more than
$790 million. † ) NASA also assigned to SSD the job of
procuring man-rated Titan II boosters to launch them.
During 1962-1963, the development work proceeded
satisfactorily and an important milestone was reached
with the successful test firing on 21 January 1964 of the
GT-1 (Gemini-Titan No. 1) launch vehicle.
* NASA was allocated $5.2 billion in new obligational authority in fiscal year
1965, $5.1 billion in fiscal year 1966.
† In February 1963 NASA estimated the cost of the 13 Geminis, two mission
simulators, five boilerplates, and other equipment at $456,650,062. By the end
of the program, however, the cost of the spacecraft and ancillary equipment had
risen to $790.4 million. [NASA Draft Chronology, Project Gemini: Technology
and Operations, pp 108, 409]
Meanwhile, McNamara’s announcement of 10 December
1963 that DoD would undertake the development of
MOL made it apparent that certain under standings
would have to be reached by NASA and DoD, since
the system required a modified Gemini. On 23 January
1964, Drs. Seamans and Brown (then DDR&E) agreed
the Air Force should negotiate a preliminary design
study contract with McDonnell, with the arrangement to
be subject to NASA review to assure McDonnell could
do the work without interfering with the space agency
program. The two officials also agreed the contract would
not establish a pattern for any follow-on engineering or
procurement contract relationship with McDonnell. 1 The
Air Force contract subsequently was approved and, in
June, McDonnell began a $1 million pre-Phase I Gemini
B study which it completed by year’s end.
In connection with this contract, the St. Louis firm was
naturally eager to obtain additional Gemini business and
retain the space engineering competency it had acquired
during its work on Mercury and now Gemini. To support
the latter, it had built up a Gemini team which included
441 personnel, 240 of them doing advanced engineering
work. McDonnell advised the Air Force that it would
need an early USAF commitment in order to keep the
team intact. The firm’s situation was discussed during
the summer of 1964 by NASA and OSD officials, and
they agreed that it was in the nation’s interest to retain
the newly-acquired industrial base. However, OSD
was unable to make a commitment until it had decided
whether or not to proceed with MOL development. 2
Toward the close of 1964 several factors, including
congressional pressures, conspired to push OSD
toward such a decision. ‡ Thus, when Senator Anderson
expressed concern to the President about duplication
between NASA and DoD space programs and
recommended cancellation of MOL, he was assured
the two agencies were working closely together and
would take advantage of each other’s technologies and
hardware. In January 1965 McNamara and Webb issued
a joint statement touching on this point. “Duplicative
programs,” they declared, “will be avoided and manned
space flight undertaken in the years immediately ahead
by either DoD or NASA will utilize spacecraft, launch
vehicles, and facilities already available or now under
active development to the maximum degree possible.” 3
‡ In March 1965 Congressman Teague of Texas expressed concern to the
President that the valuable Gemini industrial team would be disbanded if a
MOL decision was not made.