NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter XII - CONGRESS, MOL SECURITY AND THE RANGE CONTROVERSY
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Executive Branch and the chairmen of the committees
involved. When Holland threatened to take the subject
to the Senate floor and have it aired, Dr. Flax said he
thought that was something the Senator wouldn’t want
to do. “That’s for us to decide,” the Senator retorted. 25
At the conclusion of the meeting, the Florida contingent
remained dissatisfied. “This is not the end of this little
tete-a-tete,” Holland said. “We are going after this and
we are not going to stop here. We are not going to lose
this like we let Houston get away!” His reaction reflected
the great pressures he and other Florida representatives
were being subjected to from home. A flood of letters
and telegrams—from real estate dealers, developers,
citizens, and other local interests—had poured into
their offices. Some were artificially stimulated by the
local press. For example, the Melbourne Daily Times
published for its readers a clip-out form letter protesting
the proposed move of MOL to Vandenberg; more than
2,500 of these made their way to Washington. 26
Among letters sent directly to the White House was one
from the editor of the Orlando Sentinel, Martin Anderson,
one of the most vociferous critics of the Air Force. †† In
the President’s response, prepared by the MOL Program
Office, Mr. Johnson explained that the MOL was a military
space program and that polar launches were required to
accomplish its principal missions. He said:
While it is true that some polar
launches have been conducted from
the Eastern Test Range using the
“dog leg” maneuver, this does result
in a reduction of physical capacity.
In the case of the Manned Orbiting
Laboratory, the 10-15 percent loss
in payload required by performing
this maneuver is sufficient to
jeopardize seriously the success
of the program. Furthermore, there
is a risk in the case of failures
of impacting classified military
payloads in areas where classified
information might be compromised.
The facilities which will be built
at Vandenberg to launch the MOL will
be considerably simpler than those
available at the Integrated Transfer
and Launch Titan III facility at Cape
†† Not everyone protested. Orlando TV Station WFTV editorialized on 15
February 1966: “How could the Cape be losing something it never had...Local
citizens and businessmen are becoming unduly upset...The MOL is a military
project that may involve maximum security. It is possible that the whole Cape area
could be as closed as a tight security area as is the case of Vandenberg AFB.”
Kennedy. We have every intention of
using the Cape Kennedy facilities to
the maximum advantage in our space
program. In particular, there are 10
remaining launches in the Titan III
R&D program which will be used to
orbit such important programs as the
Defense communication satellites
and nuclear test detection (Vela)
satellites. Current Air Force plans
beyond those R&D launches involve
approximately four launches per year
from Cape Kennedy...” 27
Meanwhile, with the MOL Program Office facing further
interrogations by the Anderson committee, Schriever
directed Berg to organize an ad hoc task group to study
all aspects of the controversy and to report to him on
18 February. Col Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., was later
named chairman of this group, which convened the
afternoon of the 16th to begin its work. By the 19th it had
completed and gave to General Schriever and Dr. Flax
a preliminary “secret” briefing, which emphasized the
necessity of launching into “80-100 0 orbital inclinations”
to meet program objectives. Concerning facility costs
on both coasts, the ad hoc group noted that while the
Cape facilities were cheaper by some $60 to $70 million,
the decreased payload resulting from yaw steering—
and reduced number of days on orbit—made WTR
launchings more economical for long-term operations. 28
The Senate Space Committee
Hearings
On the morning of 24 February Chairman Anderson
opened “Secret level” hearings into the MOL Program.
The main witnesses were Drs. Foster and Flax
representing DoD and Dr. Seamans of NASA. To place
the matter before the committee into proper perspective,
Sen. Margaret Chase Smith introduced into the record
excerpts from hearings held in January 1965, in which
Secretary Vance had reported on DoD plans to begin
Titan III facility construction at Vandenberg. Senator
Holland then made an opening statement and introduced
into the record five editorials and stories from Florida
newspapers, all of which were highly critical of the Air
Force’s plan to “move” MOL to California. 29
Dr. Foster, the first witness, began by reading a lengthy
statement which emphasized that the MOL program was
aimed at fulfilling military requirements. He said: