NRO-MOL_2015

74 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
Schultze consequently concluded that—until the points
he had raised were clarified—“there is no clear need to
proceed with the manned system as now proposed.”
If there was a requirement to develop a system for
obtaining higher resolution than GAMBIT-3, he thought
they should proceed with development of an unmanned
system. In this connection, he cited Dr. Hornig’s
comment that if sufficient competence, imagination, and
effort were applied, unmanned systems could probably
be developed with resolution capability approaching that
expected from MOL. 10
Later, however, after he was advised that further DoD
studies indicated that the difference in cost between
a manned and unmanned system would not be $300-
1,000 million as originally thought but more nearly
$300-400 million, he withdrew his objections. However,
he requested, and Secretary McNamara agreed, that
if studies during the next six months showed a cost
difference substantially greater than $300-400 million,
the MOL should be reappraised end a new decision
made whether the additional benefits of the manned
system were worth the costs. 11
State Department and CIA Views
On 9 July 1965 the Space Council met to review the
draft McNamara memorandum to the President, the
problem of security and information handling of MOL,
and a proposed public announcement—submitted by
Mr. Webb—which the President might wish to consider.
During this meeting the Space Council identified
certain tasks for implementation prior to any public
announcement on MOL, one being to coordinate with the
State Department. Subsequently, Dr. Brown forwarded
a copy of the McNamara memorandum to the State
Department along with a proposed policy paper setting
forth proposed information controls.
Figure 40. Dean Rusk
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
In response, on 16 August Secretary of State Dean
Rusk advised McNamara that, while some international
problems would likely arise, he did not consider these
of sufficient negative importance to warrant advising
against going ahead. He said, “if you are fully satisfied
the project is justified in terms of potential contribution
to national defense, I have no objection to your going
forward with the recommendation to the President.”
Rusk said further that if a decision was made to proceed,
it would be essential to maintain very tight control of the
project and to carefully handle all publicity “if we are to
succeed in safeguarding the sensitive aspects of MOL
and deal effectively with whatever international problems
arise.” Commenting further on the information problem,
the Secretary of State stated:
I consider it most important that
to the extent it can be controlled,
everything said publicly about
the MOL project emphasize its
experimental and research nature,
and that statements and implications
that MOL constitutes a new military
operational capability in space, or
an intermediate step toward such a
capability, be rigorously avoided.
It would be useful to this end if
fully knowledgeable people in this
Department would work closely and
continuously with your own people in
devising detailed press and publicity
handling guidelines, reviewing the
text of key statements or releases,
etc. 12
The Director of the CIA also gave a general, if cautious,
endorsement to the MOL Program. Admiral Raborn
said, “It is in the interest of the United States to obtain
the highest resolution of
photographic coverage
feasible over those areas
of intelligence interest
designated by the United
States Intelligence Board,
provided that such highest
resolution will of course
have to be weighed
against the relative factors
of cost, time, and relative
importance of intelligence
which could be obtained
in an optimum balance of
these considerations.” 13
Figure 41. William F. Raborn
Source: CSNR Reference Collection