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28 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents NASA made a “counter-proposal.” It asked the Defense Department to consider a program which would not extend “quite so far as the establishment of a space station, at least as its first objective.” On 30 November, after representatives of both agencies discussed the subject further, Dr. Brown submitted to Secretary McNamara an additional memorandum which described the NASA counter-proposal. He said it appeared likely that the NASA staff would advise Webb “to agree, in principle, to a manned military space program” which was separate from but coordinated with, the NASA activity. However, they would not agree to assigning DoD “the responsibility for a space station” since they remained uncertain of their own needs for such a vehicle. Consequently, they suggested DoD fulfill its needs with an orbiting military laboratory “which does not involve the complications of personnel ferry, docking, and resupply.” 12 NASA’s proposal, it should be noted, was quite similar to the Air Force’s 1962 plan for MODS. Like the USAF plan, it also would use the Titan III to launch a Gemini capsule and a cylindrical test module capable of supporting a crew of from two to four men for 30 days. The Gemini spacecraft would weigh 7,000 pounds and the module, 15,000 pounds. Cost of the system was estimated at $593.0 million. After comparing NASA’s counter-proposal with his Alternative 3, Dr. Brown agreed that the space agency’s plan was “an entirely reasonable and orderly development approach which might well be followed whether or not the final objective is the establishment of a space station.” However, he thought that while much valuable military testing could be accomplished using NASA’s approach, it was not fully equivalent to a space station because it lacked “the operations of rendezvous, docking, resupply and crew rotation.” If Secretary McNamara accepted NASA’s counter-proposal, it would have the effect of delaying a Presidential decision on which organization would have management responsibility for a space station, “since their proposal would not be defined as a station. § ” Dr. Brown said that while NASA’s alternative was acceptable for “a near-term manned military space station,” he felt it inferior to his own recommendation, which he now reconfirmed. 13 After reviewing DDR&E’s memorandum, the same day—30 November—McNamara met with Webb and the two agency chiefs reached an oral agreement that DoD would proceed to build a military space station. As for the approach, McNamara decided to accept NASA’s § NASA did not want DoD to even use the term “space station.” An alternate name, suggested by Dr. Yarymovych, was “manned orbiting laboratory.” As was noted earlier, the Air Force in a planning document published in 1959 had referred to a “manned orbital laboratory” as one of its requirements. alternate proposal rather than the more complicated and expensive system development described in DDR&E’s Alternative 3. The Air Force’s Last Effort to Save Dyna-Soar The Air Staff had been waiting, somewhat nervously, for OSD’s decisions on the Dyna-Soar/Gemini review, but received no official word until 12 November when Dr. Brown informally advised Dr. Flax of the impending decision. However, it was not until 2 December that the Air Force received copies of Dr. Brown’s two lengthy memoranda to McNamara (of 14 and 30 November) with a request for comments. To help Dr. Flax prepare a detailed response to the Brown memoranda, a technical team from the Space Systems Division, headed by Brig Gens Joseph Bleymaier and Joseph J. Cody, was flown to Washington. Meanwhile, within Headquarters USAF there ensued a last-minute effort to save the X-20. The Air Staff prepared a 14-page paper which proposed three alternate approaches for development of a space station using the X-20 as a small two-man station or as a ferry vehicle. On 4 December the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Maj Gen John K. Hester, forwarded it to Secretary Zuckert. He said: I completely support the objective as specified in these documents (the 14 and 30 November memoranda) of achieving a manned military space capability in the most practical and least expensive manner. However, I cannot agree with the conclusion that the Gemini route coupled with cancellation of the X-20 program and initiation of a low L/D maneuvering re-entry system will achieve this objective, nor do I agree that the approach will lead to a militarily meaningful space program, either operationally or from an economic or timely point of view. Instead, I believe that a reoriented X-20 program offers a highly promising way to achieve a low cost, effective manned military capability at an early date. 14 General Hester recommended that the X-20 be considered for use in the proposed military manned space station. The same day he submitted these views, the Air Force Secretary—after discussing the issue with Deputy
Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL APPROVED 29 Figure 23. MOL Model Source: CSNR Reference Collection Defense Secretary Gilpatric—wrote to McNamara: “I hate to see us getting into a position of abandoning a program such as Dyna-Soar and start a new program which is based upon program data and costs that could be quite optimistic. In addition, I think it is going to be very hard to make clear to Congress and the public the basis for the action that is proposed.” Zuckert asked for an opportunity to discuss the subject with McNamara, “if’ the final decision has not been made. 15 Dr. Flax, meanwhile, prepared and forwarded to Zuckert his views on the “unwise” OSD proposal to cancel Dyna- Soar. He also noted that DoD had given no serious consideration to using the X-20 as a possible element of any space station program, and he commented on (among other things) the possible additional costs involved in using the Gemini: With the Gemini vehicle, even with a large number of recovery areas, it may be necessary to provide backup systems for considerably longer periods of up to a day or more. Also, in order to assure the capability for emergency sea recovery, it would be necessary to keep naval and air elements deployed on a continual basis over the entire period of manned space station flight. Costs of such deployments over the period of a year could easily negate any savings associated with any cost differential between Gemini and X-20 type vehicles. Even if emergency situations are ignored, the cost of regular monthly recoveries at sea for Gemini reentry vehicles would substantially exceed the cost of land recovery of X-20 vehicles and this may well offset any payload advantages of the Gemini. 16 On 5 December Secretary Zuckert forwarded Flax’s comments to McNamara and again expressed his opinion that the X-20 deserved to be given serious consideration for a role in the manned military space experiment. The same day Flax also dispatched to DDR&E the Air Force’s quick-reaction study and evaluation of the recommendations contained in Brown’s 14 and 30 November memoranda. Among other things, the USAF
Page 1: The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
Page 4: Center for the Study of National Re
Page 7 and 8: Contents v Contents Foreword.......
Page 9 and 10: Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
Page 11 and 12: Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
Page 13 and 14: Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
Page 15 and 16: Introduction xiii President Lyndon
Page 17 and 18: Introduction xv as determining the
Page 19 and 20: Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
Page 33 and 34: Chapter II - A National Space Stati
Page 43 and 44: Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
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Page 49 and 50: Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
Page 52 and 53: Chapter IV: PLANNING THE MANNED ORB
Page 54 and 55: 36 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Com
Page 64 and 65: Chapter V: EVOLUTION OF THE MOL MAN
Page 68 and 69: Chapter VI: RESULTS OF THE PRE-PHAS
Page 76 and 77: Chapter VII: THE LABORATORY VEHICLE
Page 88 and 89: Chapter VIII: THE MOL PROGRAM DECIS
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78 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Com
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Chapter IX: ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT
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Chapter X - THE MANNED/UNMANNED SYS
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Chapter XI - BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL,
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Chapter XII: CONGRESS, MOL SECURITY
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Chapter XIII: AIR FORCE/NASA COORDI
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Chapter XIV: NEW FINANCIAL AND SCHE
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Chapter XV: THE PROJECT TERMINATED
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Chapter XVI: POST-MORTEM
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Supplemental Documents InDeX
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